为声誉机制的制裁获得可靠的反馈
Obtaining Reliable Feedback for Sanctioning Reputation Mechanisms
摘要：
信誉机制提供了一个有效的替代验证当局建立信任的电子市场道德风险。未来的客户通过考虑过去交易的反馈来指导他们的商业决策;如果真实暴露，作弊行为会受到制裁，从而变得不理性。因此，确保理性的客户有正确的动机诚实地报告变得非常重要。作为一种替代方支付计划，明确奖励真实的报告，我们表明，诚实可以出现作为一个理性的行为时，客户有一个重复出现在市场上。为此，我们描述了一种机制，支持获得真实反馈的平衡。然后，我们描述了一组帕累托最优均衡的机制，并推导出一个上限的百分比，可以记录的机制的错误报告。理性的客户可以建立诚实报告的声誉，这一事实在这一界限的存在中扮演了重要的角色。
英文摘要：
Reputation mechanisms offer an effective alternative to verification authorities for building trust in electronic markets with moral hazard. Future clients guide their business decisions by considering the feedback from past transactions; if truthfully exposed, cheating behavior is sanctioned and thus becomes irrational. It therefore becomes important to ensure that rational clients have the right incentives to report honestly. As an alternative to side-payment schemes that explicitly reward truthful reports, we show that honesty can emerge as a rational behavior when clients have a repeated presence in the market. To this end we describe a mechanism that supports an equilibrium where truthful feedback is obtained. Then we characterize the set of pareto-optimal equilibria of the mechanism, and derive an upper bound on the percentage of false reports that can be recorded by the mechanism. An important role in the existence of this bound is played by the fact that rational clients can establish a reputation for reporting honestly.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
