We analyze strategic delegation in a Stackelberg model with an arbitrary number, n, of firms. We show that the n-1 last movers delegate their production decisions to managers whereas the first mover does not. Equilibrium incentive rates are increasing in the order with which managers select quantities. Letting u_i^* denote the equilibrium payoff of the firm whose manager moves in the i-th place, we show that u_n^*>u_{n-1}^*>...>u_2^*>u_1^*. We also compare the delegation outcome of our game with that of a Cournot oligopoly and show that the late (early) moving firms choose higher (lower) incentive rates than the Cournot firms.
Constructive proof of the existence of Nash Equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally non-constant payoff functions by Sperner's lemma
Anytime Detection of Strategic Deviations in Multi-Agent Systems
Inria（法国国家信息与自动化研究所）；Ecole Normale Supérieure, PSL Research University（巴黎高等师范学院，PSL研究大学）；Departments of EECS and Statistics, University of California, Berkeley（加州大学伯克利分校电气工程和统计学系）
Stern School of Business, New York University（纽约大学斯特恩商学院）；Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania（宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院）；Graduate Group in Applied Mathematics and Computational Science, University of Pennsylvania（宾夕法尼亚大学应用数学与计算科学研究生小组）
