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arXiv 1107.0439cs.GTcs.LO
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可计算简单对策的Nakamura数

The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games

Masahiro Kumabe, H. Reiju Mihara

摘要:

简单博弈的Nakamura数在偏好聚合(或多标准排序)中起着关键作用:参与者可以理性处理的替代品的数量总是小于这个数字。我们全面研究了一个简单的游戏的各种性质强加给它的Nakamura数的限制。我们发现,一个可计算的游戏有一个有限的Nakamura数大于3,只有当它是适当的,非强,非弱,无论它是否是单调的,或者它是否有一个有限的载体。缺乏强性通常会导致无法严格排名的替代方案。

英文摘要:

The Nakamura number of a simple game plays a critical role in preference aggregation (or multi-criterion ranking): the number of alternatives that the players can always deal with rationally is less than this number. We comprehensively study the restrictions that various properties for a simple game impose on its Nakamura number. We find that a computable game has a finite Nakamura number greater than three only if it is proper, nonstrong, and nonweak, regardless of whether it is monotonic or whether it has a finite carrier. The lack of strongness often results in alternatives that cannot be strictly ranked.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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