相关擦除信道上的物理层安全性
Physical-Layer Security over Correlated Erasure Channels
摘要：
我们探讨了额外的安全性所获得的噪声在物理层的窃听信道模型设置。最近已经提出了在物理层的安全增强，使用基于攻击者相对于发送的密文所具有的自由度的保密度量。以前的工作集中在窃听信道的情况下，可以建模为统计独立的数据包擦除信道的合法接收器和窃听。在本文中，我们超越了国家的最先进的解决相关的擦除事件在两个通信渠道。由此产生的安全性增强的相关系数和擦除概率为两个通道的函数。它表明，安全性的改善是可以实现的，通过明智的物理层设计，即使当窃听者有一个更好的通道比合法的接收器。此断言可能不成立的唯一情况是擦除在通道之间高度相关时。然而，我们能够证明，相关性不能抵消预期的安全增强，如果合法接收器的信道质量是严格优于窃听。
英文摘要：
We explore the additional security obtained by noise at the physical layer in a wiretap channel model setting. Security enhancements at the physical layer have been proposed recently using a secrecy metric based on the degrees of freedom that an attacker has with respect to the sent ciphertext. Prior work focused on cases in which the wiretap channel could be modeled as statistically independent packet erasure channels for the legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper. In this paper, we go beyond the state-of-the-art by addressing correlated erasure events across the two communication channels. The resulting security enhancement is presented as a function of the correlation coefficient and the erasure probabilities for both channels. It is shown that security improvements are achievable by means of judicious physical-layer design even when the eavesdropper has a better channel than the legitimate receiver. The only case in which this assertion may not hold is when erasures are highly correlated across channels. However, we are able to prove that correlation cannot nullify the expected security enhancement if the channel quality of the legitimate receiver is strictly better than that of the eavesdropper.
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