制度制裁、惩罚者怀疑与合作的演进
Sanctioning by Institution, Skepticism of Punisher and the Evolution of Cooperation
摘要：
本文旨在阐明制度的制裁或惩罚能够促成合作演化的情况和机制。与同伴制裁相比，机构制裁可能对玩家对不预先实施惩罚的玩家的态度敏感。与以前的研究不同，我们假设惩罚者总是合作的，惩罚者是持怀疑态度的，因为她的合作与她的团队中有多少相同类型的人加入成比例。依靠随机适应动力学，我们表明，机构制裁加上怀疑惩罚者可以合作的情况下，同行制裁可能不会演变。
英文摘要：
This article aims to clarify the case and the mechanism where sanction or punishment by institution can deliver the evolution of cooperation. Compared to peer sanctioning, institutional sanctioning may be sensitive to players' attitude toward players who do not pre-commit punishment. Departed from former studies based on the punisher who always acts cooperatively, we assume that the punishing player is skeptical in that she cooperates in proportion to how many same types join in her team. Relying on stochastic adaptive dynamics, we show that institutional sanctioning coupled with skeptical punisher can make cooperation evolve for the case where peer sanctioning may not.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
