域名系统中隐私泄漏的封堵
Towards Plugging Privacy Leaks in Domain Name System
摘要：
隐私泄露是一个不幸的和当前互联网域名解析的一个组成部分。用户生成的每个DNS查询向一个或多个DNS服务器揭示该查询的来源和目标。随着时间的推移，用户的浏览行为可能会暴露给几乎不信任或不信任的实体。目前的DNS隐私泄露源于基本的DNS功能，并且不容易通过简单的补丁修复。此外，DNS安全工作（即DNSSEC）忽视了隐私问题，因此可能会传播到未来版本的DNS中。针对当前DNS存在的隐私问题，提出了一种隐私保护域名系统（PPDNS），该系统在域名解析过程中维护隐私。PPDNS基于分布式哈希表（DHT）（一种替代命名基础结构）和计算私有信息检索（cPIR）（一种高级加密构造）。PPDNS利用DHT的索引结构来提高名称解析查询的隐私性，同时利用cPIR来减少带宽敏感客户端的通信开销。我们的分析表明，PPDNS是一个可行的方法，获得更高程度的隐私名称解析查询。PPDNS也是将先进的系统技术与加密技术相结合的示范。
英文摘要：
Privacy leaks are an unfortunate and an integral part of the current Internet domain name resolution. Each DNS query generated by a user reveals -- to one or more DNS servers -- the origin and target of that query. Over time, a user's browsing behavior might be exposed to entities with little or no trust. Current DNS privacy leaks stem from fundamental DNS features and are not easily fixable by simple patches. Moreover, privacy issues have been overlooked by DNS security efforts (i.e. DNSSEC) and are thus likely to propagate into future versions of DNS. In order to mitigate privacy issues in current DNS, this paper proposes a Privacy-Preserving Domain Name System (PPDNS), which maintains privacy during domain name resolution. PPDNS is based on distributed hash tables (DHTs), an alternative naming infrastructure, and computational private information retrieval (cPIR), an advanced cryptographic construct. PPDNS takes advantage of the DHT's index structure to improve name resolution query privacy, while leveraging cPIR to reduce communication overhead for bandwidth-sensitive clients. Our analysis shows that PPDNS is a viable approach for obtaining a higher degree of privacy for name resolution queries. PPDNS also serves as a demonstration of blending advanced systems techniques with their cryptographic counterparts.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
