虽然域名加密技术（如DNS over TLS（DoT）、DNS over HTTPS（DoH）和加密客户端Hello（ECH））的安全优势是显而易见的，但它们对用户隐私的积极影响却被仍然暴露的IP地址信息所削弱。然而，内容分发网络、基于DNS的负载均衡、不同网站在同一服务器上的共同托管以及IP地址流失都导致域-IP映射不稳定，并阻止直接的基于IP的浏览跟踪。在本文中，我们表明，这种不稳定性是不是一个障碍（假设一个通用的DoT/DoH和ECH部署），通过引入基于IP的网站指纹技术，允许网络级的观察员，以确定在规模的网站用户访问。我们的技术利用了大多数网站的复杂结构，这些网站除了主要的网站之外，还从多个域加载资源。使用超过20万个网站的指纹，我们可以成功地识别84%的网站。对于热门网站，准确率提高到92%，对于热门和敏感网站，准确率提高到95%。我们还评估了生成的指纹随着时间的推移的鲁棒性，并证明它们在两个月后仍然可以有效地成功识别约70%的测试网站。最后，我们讨论了网站所有者和托管服务提供商的策略，以阻止基于IP的网站指纹识别，并最大限度地提高DoT/DoH和ECH提供的隐私优势。
英文摘要：
Although the security benefits of domain name encryption technologies such as DNS over TLS (DoT), DNS over HTTPS (DoH), and Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) are clear, their positive impact on user privacy is weakened by--the still exposed--IP address information. However, content delivery networks, DNS-based load balancing, co-hosting of different websites on the same server, and IP address churn, all contribute towards making domain-IP mappings unstable, and prevent straightforward IP-based browsing tracking.
In this paper, we show that this instability is not a roadblock (assuming a universal DoT/DoH and ECH deployment), by introducing an IP-based website fingerprinting technique that allows a network-level observer to identify at scale the website a user visits. Our technique exploits the complex structure of most websites, which load resources from several domains besides their primary one. Using the generated fingerprints of more than 200K websites studied, we could successfully identify 84% of them when observing solely destination IP addresses. The accuracy rate increases to 92% for popular websites, and 95% for popular and sensitive websites. We also evaluated the robustness of the generated fingerprints over time, and demonstrate that they are still effective at successfully identifying about 70% of the tested websites after two months. We conclude by discussing strategies for website owners and hosting providers towards hindering IP-based website fingerprinting and maximizing the privacy benefits offered by DoT/DoH and ECH.
CipherSight: Robust Website Fingerprinting via Record-Resource Semantic Supervision under Distribution Shifts
Harbin Institute of Technology（哈尔滨工业大学）；Zhongguancun Laboratory（中关村实验室）；University of Chinese Academy of Sciences（中国科学院大学）；Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications（北京邮电大学）
SCSM: A Traffic-Native Foundation Model for Transferable Website Fingerprinting
School of Electronic Information and Electrical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University（上海交通大学电子信息与电气工程学院）；School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Southeast University（东南大学网络空间安全学院）
STAR: Semantic-Traffic Alignment and Retrieval for Zero-Shot HTTPS Website Fingerprinting
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences（中国科学院信息工程研究所）；School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences（中国科学院大学网络与信息安全学院）；Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University（清华大学网络科学与空间研究院）
PrismWF: A Multi-Granularity Patch-Based Transformer for Robust Website Fingerprinting Attack
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology（香港科技大学）；Xidian University（西安电子科技大学）；Southeast University（东南大学）；Huazhong University of Science and Technology（华中科技大学）
Efficient and Low Overhead Website Fingerprinting Attacks and Defenses based on TCP/IP Traffic
Nanjing University of Science and Technology（南京理工大学）；Zhejiang Lab（之江实验室）；Data 61, CSIRO（澳大利亚联邦科学与工业研究组织Data 61）；Shandong University（山东大学）；Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics（南京航空航天大学）
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences（中国科学院信息工程研究所）；University of Chinese Academy of Sciences（中国科学院大学）；Guangzhou University（广州大学）
密码协议被广泛用于保护用户的隐私和避免暴露隐私信息。QUIC（Quick UDP Internet Connections），包括最初由Google设计的版本（GQUIC）和IETF标准化的版本（IQUIC），作为传统HTTP的替代品，展示了其独特的传输特性：基于UDP进行加密资源传输，加速网页渲染。然而，现有的基于TCP的加密传输方案容易受到网站指纹（WFP）攻击，允许攻击者通过窃听传输信道来推断用户访问的网站。GQUIC和IQUIC能否有效抵御此类攻击值得研究。本文从流量分析的角度研究了GQUIC、IQUIC和HTTPS对WFP攻击的脆弱性。大量实验表明，在早期流量场景下，GQUIC、IQUIC和HTTPS中GQUIC最容易受到WFP攻击，而IQUIC比HTTPS更容易受到攻击，但在正常全流量场景下，三种协议的脆弱性相似。特征迁移分析表明，在正常的全业务场景下，协议间的大部分特征是可以迁移的。然而，结合潜在特征表示的定性分析，我们发现，在早期流量时，传输是低效的，因为GQUIC，IQUIC和HTTPS在早期流量上的流量分布的变化幅度显着不同。通过将一次WFP攻击升级为多次WFP Top-a攻击，我们发现在GQUIC和IQUIC上的攻击准确率分别达到95.4%和95.5%，而在HTTPS上的攻击准确率仅为60.7%。我们还证明了IQUIC的脆弱性只是轻微地依赖于网络环境。
Beyond a Single Perspective: Towards a Realistic Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks
Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University（网络科学与网络空间研究院，清华大学）；School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Southeast University（网络安全科学与工程学院，东南大学）；National Key Laboratory of Information Systems Engineering, National University of Defense Technology（信息系统工程国家重点实验室，国防科技大学）；Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University（计算机科学系，清华大学）
More Than Meets the Eye: A Semantics-Aware Traffic Augmentation Framework for Generalizable Website Fingerprinting
School of Cyberspace Security, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China（北京邮电大学信息安全学院）；School of Computer Science and Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing, China（北京航空航天大学计算机科学与工程学院）；Faculty of Computing, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, China（哈尔滨工业大学计算机学院）；School of Computer Science and Engineering, Guangxi Normal University, Guilin, China（广西师范大学计算机科学与工程学院）；Zhongguancun Laboratory, Beijing, China（中关村实验室）
