模型网络上的规范博弈:一条临界线
The norm game on a model network: a critical line
摘要:
规范博弈(normgame,NG)是由罗伯特·阿克塞尔罗德(RobertAxelrod)提出的一个讨论社会系统中规范保持水平随时间演化的框架。最近NG制定了一个社会传染的模型社会网络上的两个稳定状态:背叛者或惩罚者。在这里,我们计算这些状态之间的临界线的平面上的参数,它衡量的严重程度的惩罚和被惩罚。我们还表明,这条线的位置是更容易受到的代理人谁总是惩罚,从来没有背叛的数量,比那些总是背叛,从来没有惩罚。这一进程是根据1990年前后靠近本次会议所在地弗罗茨瓦夫的一些欧洲国家的犯罪统计数据加以讨论的。
英文摘要:
The norm game (NG) introduced by Robert Axelrod is a convenient frame to disccuss the time evolution of the level of preserving norms in social systems. Recently NG was formulated in terms of a social contagion on a model social network with two stable states: defectors or punishers. Here we calculate the critical line between these states on the plane of parameters, which measure the severities of punishing and of being punished. We show also that the position of this line is more susceptible to the amount of agents who always punish and never defect, than to those who always defect and never punish. The process is discussed in the context of the statistical data on crimes in some European countries close to Wrocław - the place of this Conference - around 1990.
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