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arXiv 0810.5291physics.soc-phphysics.comp-ph
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规范游戏-规范如何失败

The norm game - how a norm fails

Krzysztof Kulakowski, Antoni Dydejczyk

摘要:

讨论了有向随机网络节点处局中人之间的规范博弈的模拟。玩家的最终大胆程度可以与初始大胆程度不同,如$Θ$函数。这种行为的条件之一是,不惩罚的玩家自动成为叛逃者。初始大胆度的阈值可以被解释为一个标准强度。它随着惩罚的增加而增加,随着代价的减少而减少。令人惊讶的是,它也随着潜在惩罚者的数量而减少。数值结果进行了讨论的背景下,犯罪的统计数据在北爱尔兰和新西兰,离婚在美国,在波兰的酒精消费。

英文摘要:

We discuss the simulations of the norm game between players at nodes of a directed random network. The final boldness of the players can vary with the initial one as the $Θ$ function. One of the conditions of this behaviour is that the player who does not punish automatically becomes a defector. The threshold value of the initial boldness can be interpreted as a norm strength. It increases with the punishment and decreases with its cost. Surprisingly, it also decreases with the number of potential punishers. The numerical results are discussed in the context of the statistical data on crimes in Northern Ireland and New Zealand, on divorces in USA, and on the alcohol consumption in Poland.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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