arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 0903.2966cs.GT
收藏

在能量游戏中引入层次结构

Introducing Hierarchy in Energy Games

S. Lasaulce, Y. Hayel, R. El Azouzi, M. Debbah

摘要:

在这项工作中,我们介绍了层次结构的无线网络,可以模拟由一个分散的多址接入信道和能源效率是主要的性能指标。在这些网络中,用户可以自由地选择他们的功率控制策略,自私地最大化他们的能量效率。具体来说,我们以两种不同的方式引入层次结构:1。假设单用户解码在接收器,我们调查的Stackelberg制定的游戏,其中一个用户是领导者,而其他用户被假定为能够作出反应的领导者的决定; 2。假设既没有领导者,也没有追随者之间的用户,我们通过假设连续的干扰消除在接收机引入层次结构。结果表明,在非合作功率控制游戏中引入一定程度的层次结构,不仅提高了所有用户的个人能量效率,但也可以是一种方式,确保存在的非饱和均衡,并达到所需的平衡点的全局网络性能和所需的信令量之间的权衡。在这方面,一个节能网络的全球性能的测量方法被证明是一个关键问题。

英文摘要:

In this work we introduce hierarchy in wireless networks that can be modeled by a decentralized multiple access channel and for which energy-efficiency is the main performance index. In these networks users are free to choose their power control strategy to selfishly maximize their energy-efficiency. Specifically, we introduce hierarchy in two different ways: 1. Assuming single-user decoding at the receiver, we investigate a Stackelberg formulation of the game where one user is the leader whereas the other users are assumed to be able to react to the leader's decisions; 2. Assuming neither leader nor followers among the users, we introduce hierarchy by assuming successive interference cancellation at the receiver. It is shown that introducing a certain degree of hierarchy in non-cooperative power control games not only improves the individual energy efficiency of all the users but can also be a way of insuring the existence of a non-saturated equilibrium and reaching a desired trade-off between the global network performance at the equilibrium and the requested amount of signaling. In this respect, the way of measuring the global performance of an energy-efficient network is shown to be a critical issue.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑