In this work we introduce hierarchy in wireless networks that can be modeled by a decentralized multiple access channel and for which energy-efficiency is the main performance index. In these networks users are free to choose their power control strategy to selfishly maximize their energy-efficiency. Specifically, we introduce hierarchy in two different ways: 1. Assuming single-user decoding at the receiver, we investigate a Stackelberg formulation of the game where one user is the leader whereas the other users are assumed to be able to react to the leader's decisions; 2. Assuming neither leader nor followers among the users, we introduce hierarchy by assuming successive interference cancellation at the receiver. It is shown that introducing a certain degree of hierarchy in non-cooperative power control games not only improves the individual energy efficiency of all the users but can also be a way of insuring the existence of a non-saturated equilibrium and reaching a desired trade-off between the global network performance at the equilibrium and the requested amount of signaling. In this respect, the way of measuring the global performance of an energy-efficient network is shown to be a critical issue.
Infinite subgame perfect equilibrium in the Hausdorff difference hierarchy
子博弈完美均衡是完全信息博弈中的一种特殊的纳什均衡。它们很重要,因为它们关系到参与者的理性。它们总是存在于具有连续实值收益的无限博弈中,但即使在具有轻微不连续收益的简单博弈中也可能不存在。本文只考虑其结果函数在开集的Hausdorff差分层次中可测的博弈(在Baire空间中时为\textit{i.e.} $Δ^0_2$),它刻画了线性偏好族,使得每个使用这些偏好的博弈都有一个子博弈完美均衡:没有无限上升链的偏好(当然),因此对于所有参与者$a$和$b$以及结果$x,y,z$,我们有$\neg(z <_a y <_a x \,\wedge\, x <_b z <_b y)$。此外,在博弈的每个节点上,证明所构造的均衡在子博弈中发生的所有结果中都是帕累托最优的。非线性偏好的其他结果。