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arXiv 0903.1137cs.AIcs.CCcs.MA
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终止偏好诱导的复杂性

Complexity of Terminating Preference Elicitation

NICTA(国家信息与通信技术研究院);UNSW(新南威尔士大学)

Toby Walsh

摘要:

复杂性理论是一个有用的工具来研究计算问题的诱导偏好,以及战略操纵的选举聚集在一起的多个代理人的偏好。我们在这里研究的复杂性,确定何时可以终止引发偏好,并证明了复杂性取决于引发策略。例如,我们表明,从计算的角度来看,一次从一个代理中引出所有偏好可能比从多个代理中引出个人偏好更好。我们还研究了选举的战略操纵和偏好诱导之间的联系。我们表明,我们可以操纵影响操纵的计算复杂性。特别是,我们证明,有投票规则,这是很容易操纵,如果我们可以改变所有的代理人的投票,但计算棘手,如果我们只能改变他们的一些喜好。这表明,与偏好诱导一样,对操纵的细粒度看法可能是有益的。最后,我们研究了预测选举获胜者和偏好诱导之间的联系。基于这种联系,我们确定了一个投票规则,它是计算上很难决定的概率候选人获胜的概率分布在选票上。

英文摘要:

Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the complexity of determining when we can terminate eliciting preferences, and prove that the complexity depends on the elicitation strategy. We show, for instance, that it may be better from a computational perspective to elicit all preferences from one agent at a time than to elicit individual preferences from multiple agents. We also study the connection between the strategic manipulation of an election and preference elicitation. We show that what we can manipulate affects the computational complexity of manipulation. In particular, we prove that there are voting rules which are easy to manipulate if we can change all of an agent's vote, but computationally intractable if we can change only some of their preferences. This suggests that, as with preference elicitation, a fine-grained view of manipulation may be informative. Finally, we study the connection between predicting the winner of an election and preference elicitation. Based on this connection, we identify a voting rule where it is computationally difficult to decide the probability of a candidate winning given a probability distribution over the votes.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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