电子投票协议抗强制性的认知方法
An Epistemic Approach to Coercion-Resistance for Electronic Voting Protocols
摘要：
抗胁迫性是电子投票协议的一个重要的安全需求，也是最复杂的安全需求之一。在文献中已经提出了几种胁迫抵抗的定义，包括基于符号模型的定义。然而，这些模式中的现有定义在范围上相当有限，而且相当复杂。因此，在本文中，我们提出了一个新的定义的胁迫阻力在象征性的设置，基于认知的方法。我们的定义相对简单和直观。它允许对胁迫抵抗进行细粒度的表述，并且可以独立于特定的象征性协议和对手模型进行陈述。作为概念的证明，我们将我们的定义应用于三个投票协议。特别是，我们进行了第一次严格的分析，最近提出的Civitas系统。我们精确地确定了这些条件下，这个系统保证胁迫抵抗或未能胁迫抵抗。我们还分析了Lee等人和Okamoto提出的协议。
英文摘要：
Coercion resistance is an important and one of the most intricate security requirements of electronic voting protocols. Several definitions of coercion resistance have been proposed in the literature, including definitions based on symbolic models. However, existing definitions in such models are rather restricted in their scope and quite complex. In this paper, we therefore propose a new definition of coercion resistance in a symbolic setting, based on an epistemic approach. Our definition is relatively simple and intuitive. It allows for a fine-grained formulation of coercion resistance and can be stated independently of a specific, symbolic protocol and adversary model. As a proof of concept, we apply our definition to three voting protocols. In particular, we carry out the first rigorous analysis of the recently proposed Civitas system. We precisely identify those conditions under which this system guarantees coercion resistance or fails to be coercion resistant. We also analyze protocols proposed by Lee et al. and Okamoto.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
