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arXiv 0812.2324cs.ITcs.GTmath.IT
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MIMO迭代注水算法

The MIMO Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm

Gesualdo Scutari, Daniel P. Palomar, Sergio Barbarossa

摘要:

利用博弈论的方法研究了矢量高斯干扰信道中互信息的非合作最大化问题。这个问题已经被广泛研究了一些作品在过去的十年中的频率选择性信道,最近更一般的MIMO的情况下,国家的最先进的结果是有效的,只为非奇异平方信道矩阵。令人惊讶的是,当信道矩阵是矩形和/或秩亏矩阵时,这些结果不成立。本文的目标是提供一个完整的表征的MIMO游戏任意信道矩阵,在条件保证的唯一性的纳什均衡和异步分布式迭代注水算法的收敛性。我们的分析取决于新的技术中间结果,如一个新的表达式的MIMO注水投影有效(也)奇异矩阵,一个复杂的矩阵值函数的中值定理,和一般的收缩定理的多用户MIMO注水映射有效的任意信道矩阵。相当令人惊讶的结果是,在高(可能是奇异的)信道矩阵的情况下的唯一性/收敛条件比(满秩)胖信道矩阵的情况下所需的条件更具限制性。我们还提出了一个修改后的游戏和算法的唯一性的均衡和收敛的温和条件,几乎相同的性能(在纳什均衡)的原始游戏。

英文摘要:

This paper considers the non-cooperative maximization of mutual information in the vector Gaussian interference channel in a fully distributed fashion via game theory. This problem has been widely studied in a number of works during the past decade for frequency-selective channels, and recently for the more general MIMO case, for which the state-of-the art results are valid only for nonsingular square channel matrices. Surprisingly, these results do not hold true when the channel matrices are rectangular and/or rank deficient matrices. The goal of this paper is to provide a complete characterization of the MIMO game for arbitrary channel matrices, in terms of conditions guaranteeing both the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and the convergence of asynchronous distributed iterative waterfilling algorithms. Our analysis hinges on new technical intermediate results, such as a new expression for the MIMO waterfilling projection valid (also) for singular matrices, a mean-value theorem for complex matrix-valued functions, and a general contraction theorem for the multiuser MIMO watefilling mapping valid for arbitrary channel matrices. The quite surprising result is that uniqueness/convergence conditions in the case of tall (possibly singular) channel matrices are more restrictive than those required in the case of (full rank) fat channel matrices. We also propose a modified game and algorithm with milder conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium and convergence, and virtually the same performance (in terms of Nash equilibria) of the original game.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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