具有平衡搜索动力学的信息渗流
Information Percolation with Equilibrium Search Dynamics
摘要：
我们解决了在一个大的人口信息共享的均衡动力学。每个代理人都被赋予了关于共同关注的随机变量的可能结果的信号。个人选择努力寻找其他人，他们可以从他们那里收集更多的信息。当两个特工见面时，他们会分享他们的信息。收集到的信息在随后的会议上进一步分享，依此类推，存在一种均衡，在这种均衡中，代理人在获得足够精确的信息之前进行最大限度的搜索，然后进行最小限度的搜索。税收收入用于补贴搜索成本，可以改善信息共享，在某些情况下可以增加福利。另一方面，赋予代理人公共信号会减少信息共享，并且在某些情况下会降低福利。
英文摘要：
We solve for the equilibrium dynamics of information sharing in a large population. Each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a random variable of common concern. Individuals choose the effort with which they search for others from whom they can gather additional information. When two agents meet, they share their information. The information gathered is further shared at subsequent meetings, and so on. Equilibria exist in which agents search maximally until they acquire sufficient information precision, and then minimally. A tax whose proceeds are used to subsidize the costs of search improves information sharing and can in some cases increase welfare. On the other hand, endowing agents with public signals reduces information sharing and can in some cases decrease welfare.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
