For some well-known games, such as the Traveler's Dilemma or the Centipede Game, traditional game-theoretic solution concepts--and most notably Nash equilibrium--predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations. In this paper, we introduce a new solution concept, iterated regret minimization, which exhibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in many games of interest, including Traveler's Dilemma, the Centipede Game, Nash bargaining, and Bertrand competition. As the name suggests, iterated regret minimization involves the iterated deletion of strategies that do not minimize regret.
We extend the classic regret minimization framework for approximating equilibria in normal-form games by greedily weighing iterates based on regrets observed at runtime. Theoretically, our method retains all previous convergence rate guarantees. Empirically, experiments on large randomly generated games and normal-form subgames of the AI benchmark Diplomacy show that greedy weights outperforms previous methods whenever sampling is used, sometimes by several orders of magnitude.
In general, two-agent decision-making problems can be modeled as a two-player game, and a typical solution is to find a Nash equilibrium in such game. Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a well-known method to find a Nash equilibrium strategy in a two-player zero-sum game with imperfect information. The CFR method adopts a regret matching algorithm iteratively to reduce regret values progressively, enabling the average strategy to approach a Nash equilibrium. Although CFR-based methods have achieved significant success in the field of imperfect information games, there is still scope f…
A recent paper by Piliouras et al. [2021, 2022] introduces an uncoupled learning algorithm for normal-form games -- called Clairvoyant MWU (CMWU). In this note we show that CMWU is equivalent to the conceptual prox method described by Nemirovski [2004]. This connection immediately shows that it is possible to extend the CMWU algorithm to any convex game, a question left open by Piliouras et al. We call the resulting algorithm -- again equivalent to the conceptual prox method -- Clairvoyant OMD. At the same time, we show that our analysis yields an improved regret bound compared to the original…
Department of Computer Science, Princeton University（普林斯顿大学计算机科学系）
We consider regret minimization in repeated games with non-convex loss functions. Minimizing the standard notion of regret is computationally intractable. Thus, we define a natural notion of regret which permits efficient optimization and generalizes offline guarantees for convergence to an approximate local optimum. We give gradient-based methods that achieve optimal regret, which in turn guarantee convergence to equilibrium in this framework.
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a family of iterative algorithms that are the most popular and, in practice, fastest approach to approximately solving large imperfect-information games. In this paper we introduce novel CFR variants that 1) discount regrets from earlier iterations in various ways (in some cases differently for positive and negative regrets), 2) reweight iterations in various ways to obtain the output strategies, 3) use a non-standard regret minimizer and/or 4) leverage "optimistic regret matching". They lead to dramatically improved performance in many settings. For…
Monte-Carlo counterfactual regret minimization (MCCFR) is the state-of-the-art algorithm for solving sequential games that are too large for full tree traversals. It works by using gradient estimates that can be computed via sampling. However, stochastic methods for sequential games have not been investigated extensively beyond MCCFR. In this paper we develop a new framework for developing stochastic regret minimization methods. This framework allows us to use any regret-minimization algorithm, coupled with any gradient estimator. The MCCFR algorithm can be analyzed as a special case of our fr…
No-regret learning has emerged as a powerful tool for solving extensive-form games. This was facilitated by the counterfactual-regret minimization (CFR) framework, which relies on the instantiation of regret minimizers for simplexes at each information set of the game. We use an instantiation of the CFR framework to develop algorithms for solving behaviorally-constrained (and, as a special case, perturbed in the Selten sense) extensive-form games, which allows us to compute approximate Nash equilibrium refinements. Nash equilibrium refinements are motivated by a major deficiency in Nash equili…
The Technion（以色列理工学院）；Univ. Grenoble Alpes（格勒诺布尔阿尔卑斯大学）；CNRS（法国国家科学研究中心）；Inria（法国国家信息与自动化研究所）；Criteo AI Lab（科利特人工智能实验室）；École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL)（洛桑联邦理工学院）
Motivated by applications in machine learning and operations research, we study regret minimization with stochastic first-order oracle feedback in online constrained, and possibly non-smooth, non-convex problems. In this setting, the minimization of external regret is beyond reach for first-order methods, so we focus on a local regret measure defined via a proximal-gradient mapping. To achieve no (local) regret in this setting, we develop a prox-grad method based on stochastic first-order feedback, and a simpler method for when access to a perfect first-order oracle is possible. Both methods a…
University of Science and Technology of China（中国科学技术大学）；New York University（纽约大学）
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) has achieved many fascinating results in solving large-scale Imperfect Information Games (IIGs). Neural network approximation CFR (neural CFR) is one of the promising techniques that can reduce computation and memory consumption by generalizing decision information between similar states. Current neural CFR algorithms have to approximate cumulative regrets. However, efficient and accurate approximation in a large-scale IIG is still a tough challenge. In this paper, a new CFR variant, Recursive CFR (ReCFR), is proposed. In ReCFR, Recursive Substitute Val…
Regret has been established as a foundational concept in online learning, and likewise has important applications in the analysis of learning dynamics in games. Regret quantifies the difference between a learner's performance against a baseline in hindsight. It is well-known that regret-minimizing algorithms converge to certain classes of equilibria in games; however, traditional forms of regret used in game theory predominantly consider baselines that permit deviations to deterministic actions or strategies. In this paper, we revisit our understanding of regret from the perspective of deviati…
We introduce DREAM, a deep reinforcement learning algorithm that finds optimal strategies in imperfect-information games with multiple agents. Formally, DREAM converges to a Nash Equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games and to an extensive-form coarse correlated equilibrium in all other games. Our primary innovation is an effective algorithm that, in contrast to other regret-based deep learning algorithms, does not require access to a perfect simulator of the game to achieve good performance. We show that DREAM empirically achieves state-of-the-art performance among model-free algorithms in po…
Facebook AI Research（Facebook人工智能研究院）；Carnegie Mellon University（卡内基梅隆大学）
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the leading framework for solving large imperfect-information games. It converges to an equilibrium by iteratively traversing the game tree. In order to deal with extremely large games, abstraction is typically applied before running CFR. The abstracted game is solved with tabular CFR, and its solution is mapped back to the full game. This process can be problematic because aspects of abstraction are often manual and domain specific, abstraction algorithms may miss important strategic nuances of the game, and there is a chicken-and-egg problem becaus…
A dominant approach to solving large imperfect-information games is Counterfactural Regret Minimization (CFR). In CFR, many regret minimization problems are combined to solve the game. For very large games, abstraction is typically needed to render CFR tractable. Abstractions are often manually tuned, possibly removing important strategic differences in the full game and harming performance. Function approximation provides a natural solution to finding good abstractions to approximate the full game. A common approach to incorporating function approximation is to learn the inputs needed for a r…
Function approximation is a powerful approach for structuring large decision problems that has facilitated great achievements in the areas of reinforcement learning and game playing. Regression counterfactual regret minimization (RCFR) is a simple algorithm for approximately solving imperfect information games with normalized rectified linear unit (ReLU) parameterized policies. In contrast, the more conventional softmax parameterization is standard in the field of reinforcement learning and yields a regret bound with a better dependence on the number of actions. We derive approximation error-a…
Self-play methods based on regret minimization have become the state of the art for computing Nash equilibria in large two-players zero-sum extensive-form games. These methods fundamentally rely on the hierarchical structure of the players' sequential strategy spaces to construct a regret minimizer that recursively minimizes regret at each decision point in the game tree. In this paper, we introduce the first efficient regret minimization algorithm for computing extensive-form correlated equilibria in large two-player general-sum games with no chance moves. Designing such an algorithm is signi…
Università degli Studi di Milano（米兰大学）；Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)（图卢兹经济学院）；Artificial and Natural Intelligence Toulouse Institute (ANITI)（图卢兹人工与自然智能研究所）；Istituto Italiano di Tecnologia（意大利理工学院）；Sapienza Università di Roma（罗马一大（罗马智慧大学））
Bilateral trade, a fundamental topic in economics, models the problem of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. In this paper, we cast the bilateral trade problem in a regret minimization framework over $T$ rounds of seller/buyer interactions, with no prior knowledge on their private valuations. Our main contribution is a complete characterization of the regret regimes for fixed-price mechanisms with different feedback models and private valuations, using as a benchmark the best fixed-price in hindsight…
Learning strategies for imperfect information games from samples of interaction is a challenging problem. A common method for this setting, Monte Carlo Counterfactual Regret Minimization (MCCFR), can have slow long-term convergence rates due to high variance. In this paper, we introduce a variance reduction technique (VR-MCCFR) that applies to any sampling variant of MCCFR. Using this technique, per-iteration estimated values and updates are reformulated as a function of sampled values and state-action baselines, similar to their use in policy gradient reinforcement learning. The new formulati…
We study the performance of optimistic regret-minimization algorithms for both minimizing regret in, and computing Nash equilibria of, zero-sum extensive-form games. In order to apply these algorithms to extensive-form games, a distance-generating function is needed. We study the use of the dilated entropy and dilated Euclidean distance functions. For the dilated Euclidean distance function we prove the first explicit bounds on the strong-convexity parameter for general treeplexes. Furthermore, we show that the use of dilated distance-generating functions enable us to decompose the mirror desc…
University of California, Berkeley（加州大学伯克利分校）；Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems（马克斯·普朗克智能系统研究所）
In performative prediction, the deployment of a predictive model triggers a shift in the data distribution. As these shifts are typically unknown ahead of time, the learner needs to deploy a model to get feedback about the distribution it induces. We study the problem of finding near-optimal models under performativity while maintaining low regret. On the surface, this problem might seem equivalent to a bandit problem. However, it exhibits a fundamentally richer feedback structure that we refer to as performative feedback: after every deployment, the learner receives samples from the shifted d…
Regret minimization has proved to be a versatile tool for tree-form sequential decision making and extensive-form games. In large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games, modern extensions of counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) are currently the practical state of the art for computing a Nash equilibrium. Most regret-minimization algorithms for tree-form sequential decision making, including CFR, require (i) an exact model of the player's decision nodes, observation nodes, and how they are linked, and (ii) full knowledge, at all times t, about the payoffs -- even in parts of the d…
In a typical optimization problem, the task is to pick one of a number of options with the lowest cost or the highest value. In practice, these cost/value quantities often come through processes such as measurement or machine learning, which are noisy, with quantifiable noise distributions. To take these noise distributions into account, one approach is to assume a prior for the values, use it to build a posterior, and then apply standard stochastic optimization to pick a solution. However, in many practical applications, such prior distributions may not be available. In this paper, we study s…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the most successful algorithm for finding approximate Nash equilibria in imperfect information games. However, CFR's reliance on full game-tree traversals limits its scalability. For this reason, the game's state- and action-space is often abstracted (i.e. simplified) for CFR, and the resulting strategy is then translated back to the full game, which requires extensive expert-knowledge and often converges to highly exploitable policies. A recently proposed method, Deep CFR, applies deep learning directly to CFR, allowing the agent to intrinsically ab…
Regret minimization is a powerful tool for solving large-scale extensive-form games. State-of-the-art methods rely on minimizing regret locally at each decision point. In this work we derive a new framework for regret minimization on sequential decision problems and extensive-form games with general compact convex sets at each decision point and general convex losses, as opposed to prior work which has been for simplex decision points and linear losses. We call our framework laminar regret decomposition. It generalizes the CFR algorithm to this more general setting. Furthermore, our framework …
The CFR framework has been a powerful tool for solving large-scale extensive-form games in practice. However, the theoretical rate at which past CFR-based algorithms converge to the Nash equilibrium is on the order of $O(T^{-1/2})$, where $T$ is the number of iterations. In contrast, first-order methods can be used to achieve a $O(T^{-1})$ dependence on iterations, yet these methods have been less successful in practice. In this work we present the first CFR variant that breaks the square-root dependence on iterations. By combining and extending recent advances on predictive and stable regret …
Regret Minimization in Population Network Games: Vanishing Heterogeneity and Convergence to Equilibria
School of Mechanical Engineering, Northwestern Polytechnical University（西北工业大学机械工程学院）；Department of Computing, Hong Kong Polytechnic University（香港理工大学计算机学院）；Shanghai Artificial Intelligence Laboratory（上海人工智能实验室）；School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics（云南财经大学统计与数学学院）；School of Artificial Intelligence, Optics and Electronics (iOPEN), Northwestern Polytechnical University（西北工业大学人工智能、光学与电子学院（iOPEN））；School of Cybersecurity, Northwestern Polytechnical University（西北工业大学网络安全学院）
Regret minimization is a powerful tool for solving large-scale problems; it was recently used in breakthrough results for large-scale extensive-form game solving. This was achieved by composing simplex regret minimizers into an overall regret-minimization framework for extensive-form game strategy spaces. In this paper we study the general composability of regret minimizers. We derive a calculus for constructing regret minimizers for composite convex sets that are obtained from convexity-preserving operations on simpler convex sets. We show that local regret minimizers for the simpler sets can…
