In 1942 Haskell B.Curry presented what is now called Curry paradox which can be found in a logic independently of its stand on negation.In recent years there has been a revitalised interest in non-classical solutions to the semantic paradoxes. In this article the non-classical resolution of Curry's Paradox and Shaw-Kwei paradox without rejection any contraction postulate is proposed.
Intuitionistic first-order logic extended with a restricted form of Markov's principle is constructive and admits a Curry-Howard correspondence, as shown by Herbelin. We provide a simpler proof of that result and then we study intuitionistic first-order logic extended with unrestricted Markov's principle. Starting from classical natural deduction, we restrict the excluded middle and we obtain a natural deduction system and a parallel Curry-Howard isomorphism for the logic. We show that proof terms for existentially quantified formulas reduce to a list of individual terms representing all possi…
We add to intuitionistic logic infinitely many classical disjunctive tautologies and use the Curry--Howard correspondence to obtain typed concurrent $λ$-calculi; each of them features a specific communication mechanism, including broadcasting and cyclic message-exchange, and enhanced expressive power with respect to the $λ$-calculus. Moreover they all implement forms of code mobility. Our results provide a first concurrent computational interpretation for many propositional intermediate logics, classical logic included.
This reports introduces a novel sound and complete semantics for first order intuitionistic logic, in the framework of category theory and by the computational interpretation of the logic based on the so-called Curry-Howard isomorphism. Aside, a sound and complete semantics for the corresponding lambda-calculus is derived, too. This semantics extends, in a way, the more traditional meanings given by Heyting categories, the topos-theoretic interpretation, and Kripke models. The feature which justifies the introduction of this novel semantics is the fact that it is 'point-free', i.e., there is n…
This paper provides a proof that Tennant's logical system entails a paradox that is called Core logic paradox, in reference to the new name given by Tennant to his intuitionistic relevant logic.
Faculty of Technical Sciences, University of Novi Sad(诺维萨德大学技术科学学院);Mathematical Institute of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts(塞尔维亚科学院数学研究所);School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham(伯明翰大学计算机学院)
This paper sets out a predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox of propositions within the framework of Church's intensional logic. A predicative response places restrictions on the full comprehension schema, which asserts that every formula determines a higher-order entity. In addition to motivating the restriction on the comprehension schema from intuitions about the stability of reference, this paper contains a consistency proof for the predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox. The models used to establish this consistency also model other axioms of Church's intensional l…
Set theoretical paradoxes have a common root -- lack of understanding of why some multitudes are not sets. Why some multitudes of objects of thought cannot themselves be objects of thought? Moreover, it is a logical truth that such multitudes do exist. However we do not understand this logical truth so well as we understand, for example, the logical truth $\forall x \ x=x$. In this paper, we formulate a logical truth which we call the productivity principle. Bertrand Rusell was the first one to formulate this principle, but in a restricted form and with a different purpose. The principle expli…
In game theory, the notion of a player's beliefs about the game players' beliefs about other players' beliefs arises naturally. In this paper, we present a non-self-referential paradox in epistemic game theory which shows that completely modeling players' epistemic beliefs and assumptions is impossible. Furthermore, we introduce an interactive temporal assumption logic to give an appropriate formalization of the new paradox. Formalizing the new paradox in this logic shows that there is no complete interactive temporal assumption model.
In this note we study the effect of adding fixed points to justification logics. We introduce two extensions of justification logics: extensions by fixed point (or diagonal) operators, and extensions by least fixed points. The former is a justification version of Smorynski's Diagonalization Operator Logic, and the latter is a justification version of Kozen's modal $μ$-calculus. We also introduce fixed point extensions of Fitting's quantified logic of proofs, and formalize the Knower Paradox and the Surprise Test Paradox in these extensions. By interpreting a surprise statement as a statement f…
We present a calculus providing a Curry-Howard correspondence to classical logic represented in the sequent calculus with explicit structural rules, namely weakening and contraction. These structural rules introduce explicit erasure and duplication of terms, respectively. We present a type system for which we prove the type-preservation under reduction. A mutual relation with classical calculus featuring implicit structural rules has been studied in detail. From this analysis we derive strong normalisation property.
Logical systems with classical negation and means for sentential or propositional self-reference involve, in some way, paradoxical statements such as the liar. However, the paradox disappears if one replaces classical by an appropriate non-classical negation such as a paraconsistent one (no paradox arises if the liar is both true and false). We consider a non-Fregean logic which is a revised and extended version (Lewitzka 2012) of Epsilon-T-Logic originally introduced by (Straeter 1992) as a logic with a total truth predicate and propositional quantifiers. Self-reference is achieved by means o…
The aim of this paper is to provide a logic-based conceptual analysis of the twin paradox (TwP) theorem within a first-order logic framework. A geometrical characterization of TwP and its variants is given. It is shown that TwP is not logically equivalent to the assumption of the slowing down of moving clocks, and the lack of TwP is not logically equivalent to the Newtonian assumption of absolute time. The logical connection between TwP and a symmetry axiom of special relativity is also studied.
Paradoxes are interesting puzzles in philosophy and mathematics, and they could be even more fascinating, when turned into proofs and theorems. For example, Liar's paradox can be translated into a propositional tautology, and Barber's paradox turns into a first-order tautology. Russell's paradox, which collapsed Frege's foundational framework, is now a classical theorem in set theory, implying that no set of all sets can exist. Paradoxes can be used in proofs of some other theorems; Liar's paradox has been used in the classical proof of Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of truth in suffic…
Here, by introducing a version of Unexpected hanging paradox first we try to open a new way and a new explanation for paradoxes, similar to liar paradox. Also, we will show that we have a semantic situation which no syntactical logical system could support it. Finally, we propose a claim in the subject of axiomatizibility. Based on this claim, having an axiomatic system for Computability Theory is not possible. In fact, the same argument shows that many other theories are non-axiomatizable. (Dare to say: General Theories of Physics and Mathematics).
We outline an intuitionistic view of knowledge which maintains the original Brou\-wer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics for intuitionism and is consistent with the well-known approach that intuitionistic knowledge be regarded as the result of verification. We argue that on this view co-reflection $A \rightarrow {\bf{K}} A$ is valid and the factivity of knowledge holds in the form ${\bf{K}} A \rightarrow \neg\neg A$ `known propositions cannot be false'. We show that the traditional form of factivity ${\bf{K}} A \rightarrow A$ is a distinctly classical principle which, like {\it tertium non datur} $A…
Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski and (not quite) Blok-Esakia for Heyting-Lewis Implication
School of Computing The Australian National University(澳大利亚国立大学计算机学院);Chair For Theoretical Computer Science FAU Erlangen-Nuremberg(埃尔朗根-纽伦堡大学理论计算机科学教席)
The investigations on higher-order type theories and on the related notion of parametric polymorphism constitute the technical counterpart of the old foundational problem of the circularity (or impredicativity) of second and higher order logic. However, the epistemological significance of such investigations, and of their often non trivial results, has not received much attention in the contemporary foundational debate. The results recalled in this paper suggest that the question of the circularity of second order logic cannot be reduced to the simple assessment of a vicious circle. Through a …