无标度网络上囚徒困境博弈的有效支付
Towards effective payoffs in the prisoner's dilemma game on scale-free networks
摘要：
我们研究了无标度网络上的囚徒困境博弈中的有效收益的过渡，通过引入一个规范化参数，引导系统从累积的收益到每个代理的连接规范化的收益。我们发现，在这个过渡过程中，基于异质性的无标度网络的能力，以促进合作行为不断恶化，最终崩溃的结果上得到的定期图。研究了具有不同连通性的智能体的策略捐赠和适应概率。研究结果表明，策略一般是从度较大的个体向度较小的个体传播。然而，在完全正常化的收益限制下，这种策略采用流急剧逆转。令人惊讶的是，合作者占据枢纽，即使平均合作水平，由于部分正常化的回报是中等的。
英文摘要：
We study the transition towards effective payoffs in the prisoner's dilemma game on scale-free networks by introducing a normalization parameter guiding the system from accumulated payoffs to payoffs normalized with the connectivity of each agent. We show that during this transition the heterogeneity-based ability of scale-free networks to facilitate cooperative behavior deteriorates continuously, eventually collapsing with the results obtained on regular graphs. The strategy donations and adaptation probabilities of agents with different connectivities are studied. Results reveal that strategies generally spread from agents with larger towards agents with smaller degree. However, this strategy adoption flow reverses sharply in the fully normalized payoff limit. Surprisingly, cooperators occupy the hubs even if the averaged cooperation level due to partly normalized payoffs is moderate.
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