将两种标准的保密概念联系起来
Relating two standard notions of secrecy
摘要:
通常认为两种类型的定义来表示安全协议保持数据的机密性。基于可达性的保密性意味着s永远不应该被公开,而基于等价性的保密性则表明,对于攻击者来说,两次执行具有不同实例的协议应该是无法区分的。虽然第二个公式确保了更高水平的安全性,更接近密码学的保密概念,但到目前为止,可判定性结果和自动工具主要集中在第一个定义上。本文对句法保密需要强保密的情况进行了系统的研究。我们表明,在被动的情况下,可达性为基础的保密实际上意味着等价为基础的保密数字签名,对称和非对称加密提供的原语是概率。对于活跃的对手,我们在协议上提供了足够的(而且相当严格的)条件来保持这种含义。
英文摘要:
Two styles of definitions are usually considered to express that a security protocol preserves the confidentiality of a data s. Reachability-based secrecy means that s should never be disclosed while equivalence-based secrecy states that two executions of a protocol with distinct instances for s should be indistinguishable to an attacker. Although the second formulation ensures a higher level of security and is closer to cryptographic notions of secrecy, decidability results and automatic tools have mainly focused on the first definition so far. This paper initiates a systematic investigation of the situations where syntactic secrecy entails strong secrecy. We show that in the passive case, reachability-based secrecy actually implies equivalence-based secrecy for digital signatures, symmetric and asymmetric encryption provided that the primitives are probabilistic. For active adversaries, we provide sufficient (and rather tight) conditions on the protocol for this implication to hold.
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