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arXiv 1702.03168cs.CR
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选举保密性和可核查性简介

A short introduction to secrecy and verifiability for elections

Elizabeth A. Quaglia, Ben Smyth

摘要:

我们探讨的基本属性,是必要的,以确保选举计划的行为符合预期。探索揭示了我们对这些期望的理解是如何演变的,最终出现了实现期望所需的正式定义。我们提供了对保密性和可验证性的定义的见解,使我们能够学习和欣赏这些概念的潜在直觉和技术细节。有了定义,我们就可以构建选举方案,并证明其行为符合预期。并且,作为一个说明性的例子,我们回顾了Helios选举系统的一个变体,该系统以这种方式构建并证明是安全的。此外,这些定义可用于分析现有的选举计划,并揭示了脆弱性。事实上,我们描述了在分析原始Helios系统过程中发现的一系列漏洞,这些漏洞促进了我们对系统行为的理解,并促使了上述变体的设计。因此,本文通过分享对选举的宝贵见解,并展示正式定义和分析在构建保证按预期行为的方案中的价值,为安全科学做出了贡献。

英文摘要:

We explore the fundamental properties that are necessary to ensure that election schemes behave as expected. The exploration reveals how our understanding of those expectations has evolved, culminating in the emergence of formal definitions of properties necessary to fulfil expectations. We provide insights into definitions of secrecy and verifiability, allowing us to learn and appreciate the underlying intuition and technical details of these notions. Equipped with definitions, we can build election schemes that can be proven to behave as expected. And, as an illustrative example, we review a variant of the Helios election system that was built and proven secure, in this way. Furthermore, the definitions can be used to analyse existing election schemes, and vulnerabilities have been uncovered. Indeed, we describe a series of vulnerabilities that were discovered during the analysis of the original Helios system, which advanced our understanding of system behaviour and prompted the design of the aforementioned variant. Thus, this article contributes to the science of security by sharing valuable insights into elections, and demonstrating the value that formal definitions and analysis have in building schemes guaranteed to behave as expected.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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