差分相移量子密钥分发协议的强度调制序列攻击
Sequential Attack with Intensity Modulation on the Differential-Phase-Shift Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
摘要：
本文通过引入一种改进的序列攻击，讨论了差分相移量子密钥分发（DPSQKD）协议的安全性，我们的攻击不同于原始形式的顺序攻击，因为攻击者Eve不仅调制相位，而且还调制单个脉冲叠加的幅度。她发送给接收器的光子状态。特别是集中在“离散高斯”强度调制，我们表明，我们的攻击是更有效的比个人攻击，这一直是最好的攻击到目前为止。因此，Diamanti等人最近报道的通信距离为100公里的实验被证明是不安全的。此外，可以表明，在目前常用的实际实验装置中，DPSQKD协议可实现的通信距离小于95 km。
英文摘要：
In this paper, we discuss the security of the differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution (DPSQKD) protocol by introducing an improved version of the so-called sequential attack, which was originally discussed by Waks et al. Our attack differs from the original form of the sequential attack in that the attacker Eve modulates not only the phases but also the amplitude in the superposition of the single-photon states which she sends to the receiver. Concentrating especially on the "discretized gaussian" intensity modulation, we show that our attack is more effective than the individual attack, which had been the best attack up to present. As a result of this, the recent experiment with communication distance of 100km reported by Diamanti et al. turns out to be insecure. Moreover it can be shown that in a practical experimental setup which is commonly used today, the communication distance achievable by the DPSQKD protocol is less than 95km.
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