利用认证提高量子直接通信的安全性
Improving the security of quantum direct communication with authentication
摘要：
Lee，Lim和Yang最近提出了两个带认证的量子直接通信协议[Phys.Rev.A {\bf 73}，042305（2006）]。在本文中，我们将表明，在这两个协议中，应防止的trent知道的秘密消息的通信。第一个协议可以被Trent使用拦截-测量-重发攻击窃听，而第二个协议可以被Trent使用单量子比特测量窃听。为了修复这些漏洞，我修改了协议的原始版本，使用Pauli-Z操作$σ_z$代替原始的位翻转操作$X$。因此，协议的安全性得到了提高。
英文摘要：
Two protocols of quantum direct communication with authentication [Phys. Rev. A {\bf 73}, 042305 (2006)] are recently proposed by Lee, Lim and Yang. In this paper we will show that in the two protocols the authenticator Trent should be prevented from knowing the secret message of communication. The first protocol can be eavesdropped by Trent using the the intercept-measure-resend attack, while the second protocol can be eavesdropped by Trent using single-qubit measurement. To fix these leaks, I revise the original versions of the protocols by using the Pauli-Z operation $σ_z$ instead of the original bit-flip operation $X$. As a consequence, the protocol securities are improved.
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