Eavesdropping on Blind Quantum Key Distribution through a Labeling Attack

Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography

It has previously been shown that the gated detectors of two commercially available quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are blindable and controllable by an eavesdropper using continuous-wave illumination and short bright trigger pulses, manipulating voltages in the circuit [L. Lydersen et al., Nat. Photonics DOI:10.1038/nphoton.2010.214]. This allows for an attack eavesdropping the full raw and secret key without increasing the quantum bit error rate (QBER). Here we show how thermal effects in detectors under bright illumination can lead to the same outcome. We demonstrate that the detecto…

Statistical intrusion detection and eavesdropping in quantum channels with coupling: Multiple-preparation and single-preparation methods

Classical, i.e. non-quantum, communications include configurations with multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channels. Some associated signal processing tasks consider these channels in a symmetric way, i.e. by assigning the same role to all channel inputs, and similarly to all channel outputs. These tasks especially include channel identification/estimation and channel equalization, tightly connected with source separation. Their most challenging version is the blind one, i.e. when the receivers have (almost) no prior knowledge about the emitted signals. Other signal processing tasks conside…

Comment on "Quantum Key Distribution with the Blind Polarization Bases"

We show an eavesdropping scheme, by which the eavesdropper can achieve the full information of the key against the protocol [Kye et al., PRL 95 040501 (2005)] with a probability of unity and will not be discovered by the the legitimate users, even in the case that they have the perfect single-photon source and the loseless channel.

Real-time monitoring of single-photon detectors against eavesdropping in quantum key distribution systems

By employing real-time monitoring of single-photon avalanche photodiodes we demonstrate how two types of practical eavesdropping strategies, the after-gate and time-shift attacks, may be detected. Both attacks are identified with the detectors operating without any special modifications, making this proposal well suited for real-world applications. The monitoring system is based on accumulating statistics of the times between consecutive detection events, and extracting the afterpulse and overall efficiency of the detectors in real-time using mathematical models fit to the measured data. We ar…

量子密钥分发中针对探测器控制攻击的对抗措施自动化验证

Automated verification of countermeasure against detector-control attack in quantum key distribution

本文提出一种自动化测试平台，用于验证量子密钥分发中单光子探测器抵御强光控制攻击的漏洞，发现基础光电流对抗措施虽能识别连续致盲攻击，却无法察觉脉冲致盲攻击，并提出了改进建议。

分布式相位参考量子密钥分发协议的仿真

Simulations of distributed-phase-reference quantum key distribution protocols

本文在ANSYS Interconnect平台上仿真了分布式相位参考量子密钥分发协议的实际实现，并评估了后闪光、木马及探测器致盲等窃听攻击。