逆向和单边策略对公平硬币博弈的影响
Implications of contrarian and one-sided strategies for the fair-coin game
摘要:
在Shafer和Vovk \cite{sv}的博弈论概率框架下,我们得到了Skeptic关于公平硬币博弈的逆向和单边策略的一些结果.特别是,关于强大数律(SLLN)收敛速率,我们证明了怀疑论者可以强制收敛必须慢于或等于$O(n^{-1/2})$。这是通过一个非常简单的反向战略的怀疑。这种类型的结果,从下面限制收敛的收敛速率,与通过使用动量策略从上面限制SLLN的速度的更标准的结果形成对比。我们还得到了相应的单边结果。
英文摘要:
We derive some results on contrarian and one-sided strategies by Skeptic for the fair-coin game in the framework of the game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk \cite{sv}. In particular, concerning the rate of convergence of the strong law of large numbers (SLLN), we prove that Skeptic can force that the convergence has to be slower than or equal to $O(n^{-1/2})$. This is achieved by a very simple contrarian strategy of Skeptic. This type of result, bounding the rate of convergence from below, contrasts with more standard results of bounding the rate of SLLN from above by using momentum strategies. We also derive a corresponding one-sided result.
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