After some general remarks about the interrelation between philosophical and statistical thinking, the discussion centres largely on significance tests. These are defined as the calculation of $p$-values rather than as formal procedures for ``acceptance'' and ``rejection.'' A number of types of null hypothesis are described and a principle for evidential interpretation set out governing the implications of $p$-values in the specific circumstances of each application, as contrasted with a long-run interpretation. A variety of more complicated situations are discussed in which modification of the simple $p$-value may be essential.
Reacting against the limitation of statistics to decision procedures, R. A. Fisher proposed for inductive reasoning the use of the fiducial distribution, a parameter-space distribution of epistemological probability transferred directly from limiting relative frequencies rather than computed according to the Bayes update rule. The proposal is developed as follows using the confidence measure of a scalar parameter of interest. (With the restriction to one-dimensional parameter space, a confidence measure is essentially a fiducial probability distribution free of complications involving ancillar…
The problem of testing mutually exclusive hypotheses with dependent test statistics is considered. Bayesian and frequentist approaches to multiplicity control are studied and compared to help gain understanding as to the effect of test statistic dependence on each approach. The Bayesian approach is shown to have excellent frequentist properties and is argued to be the most effective way of obtaining frequentist multiplicity control, without sacrificing power, when there is considerable test statistic dependence.
Between the two dominant schools of thought in statistics, namely, Bayesian and classical/frequentist, a main difference is that the former is grounded in the mathematically rigorous theory of probability while the latter is not. In this paper, I show that the latter is grounded in a different but equally mathematically rigorous theory of imprecise probability. Specifically, I show that for every suitable testing or confidence procedure with error rate control guarantees, there exists a consonant plausibility function whose derived testing or confidence procedure is no less efficient. Beyond i…
We introduce new estimation methods for a sub-class of the Gaussian scale mixture models for wavelet trees by Wainwright, Simoncelli & Willsky that rely on modern results for composite likelihoods and approximate Bayesian inference. Our methodology is illustrated for denoising and edge detection problems in two-dimensional images.
A common concern with Bayesian methodology in scientific contexts is that inferences can be heavily influenced by subjective biases. As presented here, there are two types of bias for some quantity of interest: bias against and bias in favor. Based upon the principle of evidence, it is shown how to measure and control these biases for both hypothesis assessment and estimation problems. Optimality results are established for the principle of evidence as the basis of the approach to these problems. A close relationship is established between measuring bias in Bayesian inferences and frequentist …
Bayesian properties of the signed root likelihood ratio statistic are analysed. Conditions for first-order probability matching are derived by the examination of the Bayesian posterior and frequentist means of this statistic. Second-order matching conditions are shown to arise from matching of the Bayesian posterior and frequentist variances of a mean-adjusted version of the signed root statistic. Conditions for conditional probability matching in ancillary statistic models are derived and discussed.
Consider a testing problem for the null hypothesis $H_0:θ\inΘ_0$. The standard frequentist practice is to reject the null hypothesis when the p-value is smaller than a threshold value $α$, usually 0.05. We ask the question how many of the null hypotheses a frequentist rejects are actually true. Precisely, we look at the Bayesian false discovery rate $δ_n=P_g(θ\inΘ_0|p-value<α)$ under a proper prior density $g(θ)$. This depends on the prior $g$, the sample size $n$, the threshold value $α$ as well as the choice of the test statistic. We show that the Benjamini--Hochberg FDR in fact converges to…
Bayesian, frequentist and fiducial (BFF) inferences are much more congruous than they have been perceived historically in the scientific community (cf., Reid and Cox 2015; Kass 2011; Efron 1998). Most practitioners are probably more familiar with the two dominant statistical inferential paradigms, Bayesian inference and frequentist inference. The third, lesser known fiducial inference paradigm was pioneered by R.A. Fisher in an attempt to define an inversion procedure for inference as an alternative to Bayes' theorem. Although each paradigm has its own strengths and limitations subject to thei…
In statistical practice, whether a Bayesian or frequentist approach is used in inference depends not only on the availability of prior information but also on the attitude taken toward partial prior information, with frequentists tending to be more cautious than Bayesians. The proposed framework defines that attitude in terms of a specified amount of caution, thereby enabling data analysis at the level of caution desired and on the basis of any prior information. The caution parameter represents the attitude toward partial prior information in much the same way as a loss function represents th…
The following zero-sum game between nature and a statistician blends Bayesian methods with frequentist methods such as p-values and confidence intervals. Nature chooses a posterior distribution consistent with a set of possible priors. At the same time, the statistician selects a parameter distribution for inference with the goal of maximizing the minimum Kullback-Leibler information gained over a confidence distribution or other benchmark distribution. An application to testing a simple null hypothesis leads the statistician to report a posterior probability of the hypothesis that is informed…
The occurrence of Simpson's paradox (SP) in $2\times 2$ contingency tables has been well studied. The present work comprehensively revisits this problem using a combination of philosophical reflections, causal considerations, and probability theory. The first contribution is to provide a schematic analysis of SP in $2\times 2$ contingency tables and present new results, detailed proofs of previous results and a unifying view of the important examples of SP that have been reported in the literature. The second contribution of the paper suggests a new perspective on the surprise element of SP, r…
There are three principle paradigms of statistics: Bayesian, frequentist and information-based inference. Although these paradigms are in agreement in some contexts, the Lindley paradox describes a class of problems, models of unknown dimension, where conflicting conclusions are generated by frequentist and Bayesian inference. This conflict can materially affect the scientific conclusions. Understanding the Lindley paradox---where it applies, why it occurs, and how it can be avoided---is therefore essential to the understanding of statistical analysis. In this paper, we revisit the Lindley par…
Between Bayesian and frequentist inference, it's commonly believed that the former is for cases where one has a prior and the latter is for cases where one has no prior. But the prior/no-prior classification isn't exhaustive, and most real-world applications fit somewhere in between these two extremes. That neither of the two dominant schools of thought are suited for these applications creates confusion and slows progress. A key observation here is that ``no prior information'' actually means no prior distribution can be ruled out, so the classically-frequentist context is best characterized …
Approximate confidence distribution computing (ACDC) offers a new take on the rapidly developing field of likelihood-free inference from within a frequentist framework. The appeal of this computational method for statistical inference hinges upon the concept of a confidence distribution, a special type of estimator which is defined with respect to the repeated sampling principle. An ACDC method provides frequentist validation for computational inference in problems with unknown or intractable likelihoods. The main theoretical contribution of this work is the identification of a matching condit…
We propose an intersubjective epistemic approach to foundations of probability theory and statistical inference, based on relative entropy and category theory, and aimed to bypass the mathematical and conceptual problems of existing foundational approaches.
The University of Texas at Austin（德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校）；IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights（IBM T.J. Watson 研究中心，约克镇高地）
We present a novel method for frequentist statistical inference in $M$-estimation problems, based on stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with a fixed step size: we demonstrate that the average of such SGD sequences can be used for statistical inference, after proper scaling. An intuitive analysis using the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process suggests that such averages are asymptotically normal. From a practical perspective, our SGD-based inference procedure is a first order method, and is well-suited for large scale problems. To show its merits, we apply it to both synthetic and real datasets, and demon…
