契约选择问题的稳定结果
Stable Outcomes For Contract Choice Problems
摘要:
在本文中,我们考虑的问题,选择一组多方合同,其中每个联盟的代理人有一个非空的有限集的合同选择。我们称之为契约选择问题。我们提供的条件下,合同选择问题有一个非空集的“稳定”的结果。本文研究了两类稳定性概念:合作稳定性和非合作稳定性。我们在此援引的合作稳定性概念是核心。我们在这里研究的非合作稳定性概念是个体稳定性。本文的最终结果表明,每个合同选择问题都有一个非空的弱谈判集。
英文摘要:
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. We provide conditions under which a contract choice problem has a non-empty set of "stable" outcomes. There are two types of stability concepts we study in this paper: cooperative stability and non-cooperative stability. The cooperative stability concept that we invoke here is the core. The non-cooperative stability concept that we study here is individual stability. The final result of this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-empty weak bargaining set.
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