在古典接受非建构性的、基础性的概念为公理时，是否存在着一种二重性？
Is there a duality in the classical acceptance of non-constructive, foundational, concepts as axiomatic?
摘要：
我们考虑一个哲学问题，这是隐含在塞尔默Bringsjord的论文，“叙事的情况下反对教会的论文”：如果像门德尔松所说的那样，经典上接受的基本概念的定义，如“部分递归函数“，“函数”，“（塔斯基）真理”，“集合”等是模糊和不精确的-因此可能是非建设性的和直觉上令人反感的-然后替换一个非-另一个人的建设性概念可能在心理上没有吸引力，但它应该是元数学有效和可接受的。
英文摘要：
We consider a philosophical question that is implicit in Selmer Bringsjord's paper, "The narrational case against Church's Thesis": If, as Mendelson argues, the classically accepted definitions of foundational concepts such as "partial recursive function", "function", "(Tarskian) truth", "set" etc. are vague and imprecise - hence possibly non-constructive and intuitionistically objectionable - then replacing one non-constructive concept by another may be psychologically unappealing, but it should be meta-mathematically valid and acceptable.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
