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arXiv cs/9610101cs.AI
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面向状态域的自动协商机制

Mechanisms for Automated Negotiation in State Oriented Domains

G. Zlotkin, J. S. Rosenschein

摘要:

本文奠定了谈判的域理论的基础,也就是说,一种方式的分类互动,以便它是明确的,给定一个域,谈判机制和策略是适当的。我们定义面向状态的域,一个一般类别的相互作用。概述了合作的必要和充分条件。我们使用的价值的概念在效用的定义改变,从而使协议在更广泛的类的联合目标可达的情况。冲突解决的方法,它表明,即使在冲突的情况下,部分合作的步骤可以采取互动代理(即,代理在根本冲突可能仍然同意合作到一定程度)。一个统一的谈判协议(UNP)的开发,可用于所有类型的遭遇。它表明,在某些边界合作的情况下,部分合作协议(即,一个不能实现所有代理人目标的协议)可能被所有代理人所偏好,即使存在一个能实现所有代理人目标的理性协议。最后,我们分析的情况下,代理人的目标和价值的其他代理人的信息不完整。首先,我们考虑的情况下,代理人的目标是私人信息,我们分析了什么目标声明策略的代理人可能会采取,以增加他们的效用。然后,我们考虑的情况下,代理人的目标(因此独立成本)是共同的知识,但他们重视他们的目标是私人信息。我们引入了两种机制,一个“严格”,另一个“宽容”,并分析了它们对谈判结果的稳定性和效率的影响。

英文摘要:

This paper lays part of the groundwork for a domain theory of negotiation, that is, a way of classifying interactions so that it is clear, given a domain, which negotiation mechanisms and strategies are appropriate. We define State Oriented Domains, a general category of interaction. Necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperation are outlined. We use the notion of worth in an altered definition of utility, thus enabling agreements in a wider class of joint-goal reachable situations. An approach is offered for conflict resolution, and it is shown that even in a conflict situation, partial cooperative steps can be taken by interacting agents (that is, agents in fundamental conflict might still agree to cooperate up to a certain point). A Unified Negotiation Protocol (UNP) is developed that can be used in all types of encounters. It is shown that in certain borderline cooperative situations, a partial cooperative agreement (i.e., one that does not achieve all agents' goals) might be preferred by all agents, even though there exists a rational agreement that would achieve all their goals. Finally, we analyze cases where agents have incomplete information on the goals and worth of other agents. First we consider the case where agents' goals are private information, and we analyze what goal declaration strategies the agents might adopt to increase their utility. Then, we consider the situation where the agents' goals (and therefore stand-alone costs) are common knowledge, but the worth they attach to their goals is private information. We introduce two mechanisms, one 'strict', the other 'tolerant', and analyze their affects on the stability and efficiency of negotiation outcomes.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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