联盟形成:让步、任务关系与复杂性降低
Coalition Formation: Concessions, Task Relationships and Complexity Reduction
摘要:
联盟形成问题的解决方案通常假设代理人的理性和相应的效用最大化。这反过来又可以防止代理商做出妥协。最近的研究表明,妥协可能有助于联盟形成,并增加代理人的效用。在这项研究中,我们利用了这些新的结果。我们设计了一种新的联盟形成机制,以增强妥协。我们的机制可以利用任务依赖关系的信息,以减少形成的复杂性。此外,它可以很好地处理基数任务值和序数任务值。通过实验,我们表明,使用建议的妥协为基础的联盟形成机制提供了显着节省的计算和通信复杂性的联盟形成。我们的研究结果还表明,当使用任务依赖性的信息,联盟形成的复杂性进一步降低。我们展示了成功使用的机制,协同信息过滤,代理结合语言规则来分析文档的内容。
英文摘要:
Solutions to the coalition formation problem commonly assume agent rationality and, correspondingly, utility maximization. This in turn may prevent agents from making compromises. As shown in recent studies, compromise may facilitate coalition formation and increase agent utilities. In this study we leverage on those new results. We devise a novel coalition formation mechanism that enhances compromise. Our mechanism can utilize information on task dependencies to reduce formation complexity. Further, it works well with both cardinal and ordinal task values. Via experiments we show that the use of the suggested compromise-based coalition formation mechanism provides significant savings in the computation and communication complexity of coalition formation. Our results also show that when information on task dependencies is used, the complexity of coalition formation is further reduced. We demonstrate successful use of the mechanism for collaborative information filtering, where agents combine linguistic rules to analyze documents' contents.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。