已验证的仅限身份验证的跳过列表
Authenticated Append-only Skip Lists
摘要：
在这项工作中，我们描述，设计和分析的安全性，篡改明显的，仅附加数据结构，用于维护安全的数据序列在松散耦合的分布式系统中，各个系统组件可能相互不信任。由此产生的数据结构，称为认证的仅限跳表（AASL），允许其维护者生成整个数据序列的单向跳表，他们可以将其发布给其他人，作为对序列内容和顺序的承诺。维护者可以有效地产生简洁的证明，该证明针对发布的摘要来认证数据序列的特定位置中的特定数据。AASL即使被恶意的数据结构维护者篡改也是安全的。首先，我们表明，一个维护者不能“发明”，并验证数据元素的AASL后，他已提交的结构。第二，他不能通过证明关于数据序列的特定位置的相互矛盾的事实来含糊其辞。即使当数据序列随时间增长并且其维护者在他自己选择的时间发布连续的承诺时，情况也是如此。AASL在推理松耦合分布式系统的不可信组件维护的系统日志的完整性方面非常有用。
英文摘要：
In this work we describe, design and analyze the security of a tamper-evident, append-only data structure for maintaining secure data sequences in a loosely coupled distributed system where individual system components may be mutually distrustful. The resulting data structure, called an Authenticated Append-Only Skip List (AASL), allows its maintainers to produce one-way digests of the entire data sequence, which they can publish to others as a commitment on the contents and order of the sequence. The maintainer can produce efficiently succinct proofs that authenticate a particular datum in a particular position of the data sequence against a published digest. AASLs are secure against tampering even by malicious data structure maintainers. First, we show that a maintainer cannot ``invent'' and authenticate data elements for the AASL after he has committed to the structure. Second, he cannot equivocate by being able to prove conflicting facts about a particular position of the data sequence. This is the case even when the data sequence grows with time and its maintainer publishes successive commitments at times of his own choosing. AASLs can be invaluable in reasoning about the integrity of system logs maintained by untrusted components of a loosely-coupled distributed system.
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