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arXiv cs/0109035cs.CY
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《钟头的复仇:网络首脑如何失去对互联网的控制》

Revenge of the Bell Heads: How the Net Heads Lost Control of the Internet

Rob Frieden

摘要:

在互联网服务提供商和电信运营商之间存在着监管待遇和公司文化的二分法。电话公司的高管们(贝尔·海德)可能对监管不满,但他们接受命运,创造性地利用异常现象和机会,以确保监管赋予的竞争优势。大多数互联网服务提供商的管理人员(网络负责人)似乎都抱着自由意志主义的态度,强烈反对任何政府干预。尽管存在文化冲突,但电信和互联网世界已经融合。这种趋同会损害网络主管避免某种程度的管制的能力,特别是当它们提供的服务在功能上与钟形主管提供的服务相当时。本文将评估电信和互联网服务在市场和运营技术方面融合时的监管后果。本文指出了互联网的商业发展,以支持互联网已变得更加分层,更像电信网络的观点。本文的结论是,电信运营商将显示优越的技能,在工作的监管过程中,他们的优势。本文认为,贝尔头将智胜净头,特别是当互联网为媒介的服务的收入虹吸效应抵消了ISP租赁电信传输容量产生的收入。

英文摘要:

A dichotomy in regulatory treatment and corporate cultures exists between Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and telecommunication carriers. Telephone company executives (Bell Heads) may resent regulation, but they accept their fate and work creatively to exploit anomalies and opportunities to secure a regulation-conferred competitive advantage. Most ISP executives (Net Heads) appear to embrace a libertarian attitude, strongly opposing any government involvement. Despite the clash of cultures, the telecommunications and Internet worlds have merged. Such convergence jeopardizes the ability of Net Heads to avoid some degree of regulation, particularly when they offer services functionally equivalent to what their Bell Head counterparts offer. This paper will assess the regulatory consequences when telecommunication and Internet services converge in the marketplace and in terms of operating technologies. The paper identifies commercial developments in the Internet to support the view that the Internet has become more hierarchical and more like telecommunication networks. The paper concludes that telecommunication carriers will display superior skill in working the regulatory process to their advantage. The paper suggests that Bell Heads will outmaneuver Net Heads particularly when the revenue siphoning effect of Internet-mediated services offsets the revenues generated from ISP leases of telecommunication transmission capacity.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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