开放垄断市场的激励措施的作用--比较GTE和BOC与地方进入者的合作
The Role of Incentives for Opening Monopoly Markets: Comparing GTE and BOC Cooperation with Local Entrants
摘要：
虽然1996年《电信法》要求所有现有的地方电话公司与当地加入者合作，但该法第271条为贝尔公司（但不包括GTE）提供了额外的合作奖励。使用原始数据集，我比较了谈判的AT&T，作为一个本地的进入者，与GTE和贝尔公司在国家都经营。我的研究结果表明，差别激励的问题：贝尔容纳进入比GTE，在更快的协议证明，更少的诉讼，更优惠的价格提供网络接入。与此相一致的是，越来越多的人进入贝尔的领地
英文摘要：
While the 1996 Telecommunications Act requires all incumbent local telephone companies to cooperate with local entrants, section 271 of the Act provides the Bell companies (but not GTE) additional incentives to cooperate. Using an original data set, I compare the negotiations of AT&T, as a local entrant, with GTE and with the Bell companies in states where both operate. My results suggest that the differential incentives matter: The Bells accommodate entry more than does GTE, as evidenced in quicker agreements, less litigation, and more favorable prices offered for network access. Consistent with this, there is more entry into Bell territories
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
