风险厌恶投标人多单位拍卖中单调均衡的普遍不存在性
Universal Nonexistence of Monotone Equilibrium in Multiunit Auctions with Risk Aversion
AI总结:
该研究针对风险厌恶投标人的多单位拍卖,证明了在统一定价、歧视性定价等规则下,单调纯策略均衡普遍不存在,并将结果扩展至全支付拍卖与有限出价网格。
摘要:
我们针对风险厌恶投标人的多单位拍卖,建立了单调纯策略均衡的普遍不存在性结果。设定投标人数量大于1,且所有投标人的效用函数均为严格递增的凹函数,其中至少有一名投标人是严格风险厌恶的。在统一定价规则下,对于至少3个单位的任意供给量,我们构造了独立的满支撑类型分布,使得最低获胜出价定价和最高失利出价定价均不存在可容许的单调均衡。在歧视性定价规则下,我们构造了有限供给量和独立的满支撑类型分布,排除了单调纯策略均衡的存在。我们将这些结果扩展到全支付拍卖和有限出价网格的情形。
英文摘要:
We establish universal nonexistence results for monotone pure-strategy equilibrium in multiunit auctions with risk-averse bidders. Fix any number of bidders greater than one and any profile of strictly increasing concave utilities, with at least one strictly risk-averse bidder. Under uniform pricing, for every supply of at least three units, we construct independent, full-support type distributions under which neither lowest-winning-bid nor highest-losing-bid pricing admits an admissible monotone equilibrium. Under discriminatory pricing, we construct a finite supply and independent, full-support type distributions that preclude monotone pure-strategy equilibrium. We extend these results to all-pay auctions and finite bid grids.
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