超越身份创建:身份与时间中的双线性Sybil成本
Beyond Identity Creation: Bilinear Sybil Cost in Identities and Time
AI总结:
本文研究Sybil防御中维持身份影响力的成本,提出双线性Sybil成本概念,给出四个实现该成本的充分条件,证明可验证延迟函数满足条件且性能优于哈希谜题,实验验证其有效性。
摘要:
Sybil防御机制对身份创建进行定价,但影响力往往归于活跃身份。本文研究维持影响力的成本:若防御机制在T个周期内保持s个身份活跃的成本至少为sT/A个诚实单位,即每个身份-周期的平均成本至少为诚实参与者成本的1/A倍,则该防御机制具有比率为A的双线性Sybil成本。仅靠重复性无法保证该成本,成本可从早期周期结转、在多个身份间分摊,或在快速硬件替代数千个诚实设备工作时可忽略不计。本文为每个周期检查所有身份的防御机制给出四个实现双线性Sybil成本的充分条件:身份绑定、新鲜性、共享截止期限以及顺序、不可批量处理的工作。这些条件带来两项保证:总双线性成本中A为攻击者最快硬件的速度优势;且因工作必须新鲜并在共同截止期限前完成,某一周期内活跃身份数量受该时刻运行的处理器数量限制。本文证明四个条件中任意一个都无法由其余三个推导得出。绑定身份输入的可验证延迟函数无需支付即可满足所有四个条件,其A值对CPU为2至8,对假设的ASIC约为28,而哈希谜题的A值为10³至10⁷。实验测得每个核心每个周期对应一个活跃身份,而签名心跳机制下约为80000个;批量处理多达1000个身份无增益,且可拒绝所有测试攻击。
英文摘要:
Sybil defenses price the creation of an identity, yet influence goes, again and again, to active identities. We study the cost of maintaining influence. A defense has a bilinear Sybil cost with ratio $A$ if keeping $s$ identities active for $T$ periods costs at least $sT/A$ honest units: the average cost per identity-window is at least $1/A$ times an honest participant's cost. Recurrence alone does not guarantee this cost. The cost can be carried over from earlier periods, shared among many identities, or be negligible when fast hardware does the work of thousands of honest devices. We give four sufficient conditions for a defense that checks every identity each period to achieve bilinear Sybil cost: identity binding, freshness, a shared deadline, and sequential, non-batchable work. They yield two guarantees: a bilinear total cost, with $A$ the speed advantage of the adversary's fastest hardware, and, because the work must be fresh and finished by a common deadline, a bound on the identities active in a period by the processors running at that time. We prove that none of the four follows from the other three. A verifiable delay function on an identity-bound input meets all four without payments, with $A$ of 2 to 8 for CPUs and about 28 for a hypothetical ASIC, against $10^3$ to $10^7$ for hash puzzles. We measure one active identity per core per period against about 80,000 under a signed heartbeat, no gain from batching up to 1,000 identities, and rejection of all tested attacks.
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