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arXiv 2610.19699cs.GT
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以太坊权益证明中的有效余额设计

Effective-Balance Design in Ethereum Proof-of-Stake

HKUST(GZ)(香港科技大学(广州))

Bolin Zhang, Xuechao Wang

AI总结:

研究以太坊PoS的有效余额规则,将其作为机制设计问题,通过模拟发现降低储备价格可增加活跃身份和总有效余额,为PoS系统的安全设计提供参考。

摘要:

权益证明(PoS)系统是工作量证明(PoW)的可扩展且节能的替代方案,其经济安全高度依赖通过校准良好的质押奖励机制激励广泛且有意义的参与。我们将以太坊的有效余额规则作为机制设计问题进行研究,其中协议选择奖励系数、激活阈值和最大有效余额,验证者在由此产生的比例分配博弈中做出响应。对于固定的参与验证者和身份数量,我们在验证者层面的总质押中建立了唯一的纳什均衡。当验证者可以拆分或合并其可见身份时,每个候选身份结构必须在市场重新清算后进行评估,因此重组激励取决于考虑所有验证者质押响应的重置后收益比较。为进行说明性模拟,我们从信标链的存款和取款、Lido质押流量、Etherscan余额以及校准的合成代理构建地址级预算代理。使用说明性成本系数,将储备价格从32 ETH降至30 ETH,会使活跃身份增加5.922%,总有效余额增加0.098%。

英文摘要:

Proof-of-Stake (PoS) systems offer a scalable and energy-efficient alternative to Proof-of-Work (PoW). The economic security of PoS relies critically on incentivizing broad and meaningful participation through well-cali\-brated staking reward mechanisms. We study Ethe\-reum's effective-balance rules as a mechanism-design problem in which the protocol chooses a reward coefficient, an activation threshold, and a maximum effective balance, and validators respond in the induced propor\-tional-allocation game. For fixed participating validators and identity counts, we establish a unique Nash equilibrium in validator-level total stakes. When validators can split or merge their visible identities, each candidate identity structure must be evaluated after the market re-clears. Restructuring incentives therefore depend on post-reset payoff comparisons that account for all validators' stake responses. For an illustrative simulation, we construct address-level budget proxies from Beacon Chain deposits and withdrawals, Lido staking flows, Etherscan balances, and calibrated synthetic agents. With illustrative cost coefficients, lowering the reserve price from 32 ETH to 30 ETH increases active identities by 5.922\% and total effective stake by 0.098\%.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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