消费惯性与攀比的平均场模型
A Mean Field Model of Consumption Inertia and Keeping Up with the Joneses
AI总结:
本文构建消费惯性与攀比的平均场模型,证明相关均衡存在性,计算异质群体支出调整均衡,量化忽略继承标准等的成本,为消费投资决策提供理论支撑。
摘要:
家庭会将自身生活水平与他人比较,且不愿改变生活水平。本文研究效用取决于消费相对于基准(即人口几何平均消费)的消费与投资问题,其中效用减少的权重高于效用增加的权重,资产收益为外生变量。对于有限类型家庭、任意初始财富及继承标准的情况,在弱相互作用条件下存在平均场均衡;对于固定预算乘数,基准是压缩映射的不动点。在具有共同风险的完备市场中,基于经验类型频率的平均场均衡是有限博弈的精确纳什均衡,适用于任何相对消费偏好。当使用基于其他构成计算的计划时,我们对偏离的收益进行了界定。我们计算了均衡,其中具有不同财富、继承标准和损失厌恶的群体在不同日期调整支出。在家庭同质且风险共担的情况下,唯一对称均衡是具有修正曲率的单个损失厌恶家庭的策略。在基准示例中,忽略继承标准的成本高达财富的17%,而对参考群体构成的小误差成本低于0.5%。
英文摘要:
Households compare their living standard with others' and dislike changing it. We study consumption and investment when felicity depends on consumption relative to a benchmark, the population's geometric average consumption, and cuts in felicity weigh more than increases. Asset returns are exogenous. For finitely many types and arbitrary initial wealth and inherited standards, a mean field equilibrium exists under a weak interaction condition, and for fixed budget multipliers the benchmark is the fixed point of a contraction. In a complete market with common risk, a mean field equilibrium at empirical type frequencies is an exact Nash equilibrium of the finite game, for any preferences over relative consumption. We bound the gain from deviating when plans computed at another composition are used. We compute equilibria in which groups with different wealth, inherited standards, and loss aversion revise spending at different dates. With identical households and common risk, the unique symmetric equilibrium is the policy of a single loss averse household with modified curvature. In a baseline example, ignoring the inherited standard costs up to 17% of wealth, while small errors about the composition of the reference group cost less than 0.5%.
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