配置效率与创新回报
Allocative Efficiency and the Returns to Innovation
AI总结:
该研究探讨网络产量竞争下创新者回报与配置效率变化的关系,发现研发社会回报远高于私人回报,商业窃取效应的核算会低估研发的社会回报。
摘要:
当网络中的生产者以产量进行竞争时,创新者的利润并不包含其创新所导致的配置效率变化(无论该变化是收益还是损失),因为创新者自身的选择是最优的,且对其利润的其他影响均为转移支付。对于过程创新者而言,在固定配置下,其创新新增产出所产生的自身及下游加成会被放弃,这一价值相当于2015年美国上市公司成本节约额的14%至26%。对于占销售额68%的创新者来说,配置效率的变化超过了私人回报的十分之一。在马尔可夫研发博弈中,企业间研发的重新配置同样对创新者具有外部性。竞争对手的利润和市场价值甚至可能在符号上误报从它们那里窃取商业活动的福利成本。结合估计的溢出效应,研发的社会回报是私人回报的5.39倍,而基于产出核算并结合估计的商业窃取效应时,这一比例为2.53倍,主要原因在于该核算方式将竞争对手损失的销售额计入创新者的收益。
英文摘要:
Innovation changes welfare by improving technology and reallocating inputs across producers with different markups. When producers choose markups optimally, an innovator's own output and price adjustments have no private value at the margin, so reallocation affects its profit only through others' responses. For an innovator small in its markets, the change in allocative efficiency is of the same order as its cost saving but does not reach its profit. A process innovator is paid its cost saving, forgoing its own and downstream markups on added output. For U.S. public firms in 2015, these forgone markups average 26 percent of that saving. For innovators accounting for 56 percent of sales, allocative efficiency rises or falls by more than a tenth of their private return. With estimated spillovers, patenting firms' R&D has a social return 6.24 times its private return.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。