发表机构
Offchain Labs; University of Tartu（Offchain Labs; 塔尔图大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本研究针对Rollup中验证与注意力奖励机制的执行多样性问题，提出带注册证明者的论证框架，设计耦合Tullock式竞赛机制，对比TRACE与勤奋证明，将结果应用于Arbitrum One以提升执行多样性。
AI 中文摘要
乐观Rollup的安全性取决于至少一名诚实验证者执行其状态转换函数（STF）并对与执行结果不一致的断言提出异议。然而，允许任何人参与这一过程却未提供相应激励：只要所有断言均正确，验证断言正确性就不会获得报酬。注意力机制通过向节点支付报酬来解决这一问题，无论节点是否参与验证过程，都需执行Rollup的STF。由于单个节点运营商可通过一次执行支持多个已注册身份，按身份支付报酬并不能获得执行多样性，即独立执行的运营商数量。在本研究中，我们为该问题提供了新的建模框架。我们将底层密码原语形式化为新的概念——带注册证明者的论证，其属性包括一种非摊销性，据我们所知，这是现代简洁密码证明中尚未研究过的特性。我们设计了验证与注意力奖励机制，并将其分析为两个耦合的Tullock式竞赛，其中运营商为所需执行支付一次费用，随后选择在每个角色中部署的身份数量。我们将均衡状态下可实现的执行多样性范围量化为额外注意力身份部署边际成本的函数。我们利用该框架比较两种注意力机制：TRACE（MARBLE 2026）与勤奋证明（AFT 2024）。特别地，我们表明，与勤奋证明不同，TRACE中上述边际成本可调整以支持更高的执行多样性。作为案例研究，我们将结果应用于广泛部署的乐观Rollup Arbitrum One。
英文摘要
An optimistic rollup is safe as long as at least one honest validator executes its state transition function (STF) and disputes any assertion that is inconsistent with the result of the execution. Allowing anyone to participate, however, does not give incentive to do so: as long as every assertion is correct, verifying assertion correctness goes unpaid. Attention mechanisms address this by paying nodes to execute the rollup's STF, regardless of whether they participate in the validation process. Since a single node operator can back many registered identities with a single execution, paying per identity does not buy execution diversity, that is, the number of operators that independently execute. In this work we provide a new modeling framework for this problem. We formalize the underlying cryptographic primitive as a new notion, arguments with registered provers, whose properties include a form of non-amortizability that, to our knowledge, has not been studied for modern succinct cryptographic proofs before. We design validation and attention reward mechanisms and analyze them as two coupled Tullock-like contests, in which an operator pays once for the required execution and then chooses how many identities to deploy in each role. We quantify the attainable range of execution diversities in equilibrium as a function of the marginal cost of deploying an extra attention identity. We use our framework as a lens through which we compare two attention mechanisms, TRACE (MARBLE 2026) and Proof of Diligence (AFT 2024). In particular, we show that as opposed to Proof of Diligence, in TRACE the marginal cost mentioned above can be adjusted to support a higher execution diversity. As a case study, we apply our results to Arbitrum One, a widely deployed optimistic rollup.
