面向时间关键自主行动的任务感知证明封装：一种硬件在环V2I研究
Mission-Aware Attestation Envelopes for Time-Critical Autonomous Action: A Hardware-in-the-Loop V2I Study
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中文总结 AI 辅助
针对时间关键自主行动，提出任务感知证明作为运行时保证契约，区分篡改、过期与延迟拒绝，并在硬件在环V2I平台上验证，证明间隔为可配置部署参数。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
一个请求特权物理行动的自主系统通常以完整性证据为门控：平台证明其正在运行的内容，请求基于此被批准或拒绝。这样的门控通常被视为一个谓词，然而其背后的证据具有时效性，消费该证据的决策具有延迟，而等待该决策的物理系统具有截止期限。我们将任务感知证明表述为一种运行时保证契约，该契约仅在完整性有效、证据足够新鲜且决策在当前物理状态导出的预算内完成时成立。该契约产生四种操作结果，而二元门控仅产生两种，从而将因篡改导致的拒绝与因证据过期导致的拒绝以及因决策延迟导致的拒绝区分开来。我们在一个硬件在环的车对基础设施平台上对其进行了评估：驾驶模拟器提供物理状态和授权截止期限，而微控制器车载单元和基于TPM的路边单元（运行Linux完整性度量）提供保证证据。一个对安全盲目的模型接纳了整个操作空间，而一个硬件感知的模型接纳了其中的四分之三，并且其拒绝的每个点都未能满足新鲜度余量而非响应余量。将证明间隔移动到验证器允许的范围内，其代价大约相当于延迟分布的五倍缩放，并且该间隔可直接配置，这使其成为立即可操作的部署参数。如果新鲜度界限不超过授权预算，则每个延迟决策也都是过期的，且延迟变得不可观察，因此证明间隔和新鲜度界限不能仅从安全要求中选择。
英文摘要
An autonomous system that asks for a privileged physical action is usually gated on integrity evidence: a platform proves what it is running, and the request is granted or refused on that basis. Such a gate is normally treated as a predicate, yet the evidence behind it has an age, the decision that consumes it has a latency, and the physical system that waits for it has a deadline. We formulate mission-aware attestation as a runtime assurance contract that holds only when integrity is valid, the evidence is fresh enough, and the decision completes inside a budget derived from the current physical state. The contract yields four operational outcomes where a binary gate yields two, separating a refusal caused by tampering from one caused by stale evidence and from one caused by a late decision. We evaluate it on a hardware-in-the-loop vehicle-to-infrastructure platform: a driving simulator supplies the physical state and the authorisation deadline, while a microcontroller on-board unit and a TPM-backed roadside unit running Linux integrity measurement supply the assurance evidence. A security-blind model admits the whole operating space and a hardware-informed one three quarters of it, and every point it refuses fails the freshness margin rather than the response margin. Moving the attestation interval across the range the verifier permits costs about as much as a fivefold scaling of the latency distribution, and the interval is directly configurable, which makes it the immediately actionable deployment parameter. If the freshness bound does not exceed the authorisation budget, every late decision is also stale and lateness becomes unobservable, so the attestation interval and the freshness bound cannot be chosen from security requirements alone.
发表机构
- International Hellenic University（国际希腊大学）
- Clone Systems（克隆系统公司）
- University of Macedonia（马其顿大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
