发表机构
Swiss Economics; Somaha Foundation（瑞士经济学; 索马哈基金会）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文研究基金会如何通过承诺自身寿命（终止、永续或自由裁量）来约束未来决策者，并分析各制度的最优条件，指出组织寿命是独立的承诺维度。
AI 中文摘要
一个组织可以通过对其自身寿命的承诺来约束未来的决策者。本文研究了慈善基金会中的这一选择。基金会可以选择承诺终止、承诺机构延续，或将终止决定留给未来的自由裁量。自由裁量保留了依状态而定的停止权。永续经营则增加了对基金会特定组织资本的投资，而这种资本的回报在终止时会部分损失。当未来的管理机构从组织存续中获得私人利益时，终止承诺限制了过度的延续。一个经典模型产生了每个制度均最优的非空区域，而有限期限扩展则内生了终止日期。当组织资本的生产率相对于在不利状态下继续经营的成本足够高时，永续经营是最优的；当停止的灵活性有价值且治理结构一致时，自由裁量是最优的；当存续激励导致代价高昂的固守时，有限寿命是最优的。因此，组织寿命是一个独特的承诺维度。
英文摘要
An organization may bind future decision makers through a commitment over its own lifespan. This paper studies that choice for philanthropic foundations. A foundation may commit to terminate, commit to institutional continuity, or leave termination to future discretion. Discretion preserves state-contingent stopping. Perpetuity instead raises investment in foundation-specific organizational capital whose return is partly lost upon termination. A terminal commitment limits excessive continuation when future governing bodies obtain private benefits from organizational survival. A canonical model yields nonempty regions in which each regime is optimal, while a finite-horizon extension endogenizes the terminal date. Perpetuity is optimal when organizational capital is sufficiently productive relative to the cost of continuing in bad states; discretion is optimal when stopping flexibility is valuable and governance is aligned; a finite lifespan is optimal when survival incentives create sufficiently costly entrenchment. Organizational lifespan is therefore a distinct commitment margin.
