发表机构
Institute of Science Tokyo（东京科学大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文研究单峰偏好下爬行器机制的均衡配置，证明其纳什均衡配置在弱帕累托占优下构成完全格，真实配置为最大元，初始禀赋为最小元。
AI 中文摘要
我们研究具有单峰偏好的物品再分配问题。在严格偏好的无限制域上，顶级交易环（TTC）是唯一满足效率、个体理性与策略证明性的规则。在单峰偏好域上，Bade（2019）引入的爬行器满足相同性质。我们证明，在弱帕累托占优下，爬行器直接显示机制的纳什均衡配置构成一个完全格。真实配置是该格的最大元，而初始禀赋配置是其最小元。
英文摘要
We study object reallocation problems with single-peaked preferences. On the unrestricted domain of strict preferences, top trading cycles (TTC) is the unique rule that satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. On the single-peaked preference domain, the crawler introduced by Bade (2019) satisfies the same properties. We show that the Nash equilibrium allocations of the crawler's direct revelation game form a complete lattice under weak Pareto dominance. The truthful allocation is the greatest element of this lattice, while the initial endowment allocation is its least element.
