发表机构
Economics Department, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill（北卡罗来纳大学教堂山分校经济学系）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
研究产能可签约但产出不可签约时，通过单一产能下限实施最优垄断监管，以扩大服务并允许利用不足作为必要代价。
AI 中文摘要
我们研究当产能可签约但后续产出不可签约时的垄断监管问题。企业在安装昂贵产能之前私下观察其生产成本，然后选择产出，而监管者不能使用转移支付。我们提供了充分条件，使得单一的产能下限能够实施一个具有完全参与的最优机制。该下限通过改变投资来提高产出，同时在安装成本沉没后将利用率决策留给企业。在附加条件下，配置分为三个区域：自由放任、下限的充分利用和利用不足。高成本类型明知其安装的产能不会被充分利用，但其产出仍高于自由放任情形。这种物理浪费是扩大服务的最优监管中不可避免的代价。我们还表明，在具有产能条件补贴或统一进入费的最优监管中，利用不足可能持续存在。
英文摘要
We study monopoly regulation when capacity is contractible but subsequent output is not. A firm privately observes its production cost before installing costly capacity and then choosing output, while the regulator cannot use transfers. We provide sufficient conditions under which a single capacity floor implements an optimal mechanism with full participation. The floor raises output by changing investment while leaving utilization to the firm after installation costs are sunk. Under additional conditions, the allocation has three regions: laissez-faire, full utilization of the floor, and underutilization. High-cost types knowingly install capacity they will not fully use, yet produce more than under laissez-faire. This physical waste is a necessary evil of optimal regulation that expands service. We also show that underutilization can persist in optimal regulation with capacity-contingent subsidies or a common entry fee.
