发表机构
University of Arizona（亚利桑那大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本研究通过实地实验和MTE框架，证明固定工资合同存在道德风险与逆向选择，并发现对计件工资征税能以低社会成本缓解逆向选择。
AI 中文摘要
与自雇或绩效工资相比，固定工资降低了收入的不确定性，但容易通过道德风险和逆向选择导致市场扭曲。利用信息不对称下的工资合同模型，我表明这些扭曲对应于边际处理效应（MTE）框架中的边际处理响应函数。我将该框架应用于一项实地实验，其中数据录入工人在随机化的固定工资和计件工资之间进行选择。我发现了道德风险和逆向选择两方面的证据：固定工资使工人生产率相对于均值降低了估计8.74个百分点。同时，工资报价提高10%会吸引一个边际工人，其生产率比均值高出1.90个百分点。利用半参数MTE估计，我计算了与信息不对称相关的福利损失以及旨在弥补该损失的政策的公共资金边际价值（MVPFs）。我发现，对计件工资征税可以缓解固定工资中的逆向选择，以低至每美元0.88美元的社会成本产生税收收入。
英文摘要
Compared to self-employment or performance-based pay, fixed wages reduce earnings uncertainty but are prone to market distortions through moral hazard and adverse selection. Using a model of wage contracts under asymmetric information, I show that these distortions map to marginal treatment response functions in a marginal treatment effects (MTE) framework. I apply this framework to a field experiment in which data-entry workers choose between a randomized fixed wage and a piece rate. I find evidence of both moral hazard and adverse selection: Fixed wages reduce worker productivity by an estimated 8.74 percent relative to the mean. Meanwhile, a 10 percent increase in the wage offer attracts a marginal worker whose productivity is higher by 1.90 percent of the mean. Using semi-parametric MTE estimation, I calculate the welfare loss associated with asymmetric information and the marginal values of public funds (MVPFs) for policies aimed at recovering this loss. I find that a tax on piece rates can mitigate adverse selection into fixed wages, generating tax revenue at social costs as low as $0.88 per dollar.
Comments96 pages, including appendices
