发表机构
Utrecht University（乌得勒支大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文研究发送者-接收者博弈中的支付承诺，刻画不同承诺顺序下的均衡福利与计算复杂性，并证明最优私有随机化发送者收益等价于贝叶斯说服值。
AI 中文摘要
我们研究了发送者-接收者博弈，其中参与者在状态被抽取之前，承诺根据随后验证的状态和接收者的行动进行支付。支付可以转移或销毁，作为合同保证或承诺的小费。我们分析了均衡保证、福利和计算复杂性。对于任意有限行动集，我们刻画了单边承诺下的悲观效用保证。仅发送者承诺和发送者优先承诺的最坏均衡福利等于最佳常数行动福利。同时承诺反而可能将福利降低到原始博弈的每个均衡之下。同时承诺和发送者优先承诺都不总能承认一个高效均衡。接收者优先承诺总是承认一个可高效计算的福利最大化均衡，但也可能降低最坏均衡福利。对于二元行动，我们刻画了其整个均衡收益区域。对于二元行动，最优接收者承诺可在线性时间内计算，而优化确定性发送者承诺是NP难的。私有随机化发送者承诺承认一个精确的$O(n\log n)$算法，其中最优彩票最多包含两个方案，且这两个方案仅在一个状态上不同。这产生了确定性承诺的加性近似。对于任意有限行动集，最优私有随机化发送者收益等于贝叶斯说服值：仅允许销毁时的普通说服，以及允许转移时的具有非负合规支付的说服。这些等价性产生了具有多项式大小承诺彩票的多项式时间算法。
英文摘要
We study sender-receiver games in which players commit, before the state is drawn, to payments contingent on the subsequently verified state and the receiver's action. Payments may be transferred or burned, serving as contractual guarantees or promised tips. We analyze equilibrium guarantees, welfare, and computational complexity. For arbitrary finite action sets, we characterize pessimistic utility guarantees under unilateral commitments. Sender-only and sender-first commitments have worst-equilibrium welfare equal to the best constant-action welfare. Simultaneous commitments can instead reduce welfare below every equilibrium of the original game. Neither simultaneous nor sender-first commitments always admit an efficient equilibrium. Receiver-first commitments always admit an efficiently computable welfare-maximizing equilibrium, but can also reduce worst-equilibrium welfare. For binary actions, we characterize their entire equilibrium payoff region. With binary actions, optimal receiver commitments are computable in linear time, whereas optimizing deterministic sender commitments is NP-hard. Privately randomized sender commitments admit an exact $O(n\log n)$ algorithm, with an optimal lottery over at most two schemes differing at only one state. This yields an additive approximation by deterministic commitments. For arbitrary finite action sets, optimal privately randomized sender payoffs equal Bayesian persuasion values: ordinary persuasion with burning alone, and persuasion with nonnegative compliance payments when transfers are allowed. These equivalences yield polynomial-time algorithms with polynomial-size commitment lotteries.
