发表机构
ENAC (University of Toulouse)（法国国立民用航空学院（图卢兹大学））
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
研究投稿配额作为自我筛选机制，在稿件生产成本低而评审稀缺时，通过序数提名实现稳健选择，并推导等负荷条件以平衡灵活性与稳健性。
AI 中文摘要
当稿件生产成本变得低廉而专家评审仍然稀缺时，投稿权便具有了价值。一项不可转让的作者配额将投稿转化为一种揭示优先级的决策：作者仅利用序数信息提名其最优项目，并且在信息丰富的排序下，增加候选项目不会使所选组合变差。其代价是在跨作者和已实现项目之间分配评审能力时缺乏灵活性。在一个可处理的基准模型中，我推导出了精确的等负荷条件，在该条件下，配额对异质性费用敏感性和基数校准误差的稳健性超过了这一代价。在项目价值有界的情况下，资源的充裕可以将等负荷费用转变为一种准入筛选机制，而配额则保留了作者内部的策展功能。
英文摘要
When manuscripts become cheap to produce but expert evaluation stays scarce, submission rights acquire value. A non-transferable author quota turns submission into a revealed-priority decision: authors nominate their top projects using only ordinal information, and, with informative rankings, adding candidates cannot worsen the selected portfolio. The cost is inflexibility in allocating review capacity across authors and realised projects. In a tractable benchmark, I derive the exact equal-load condition under which the quota's robustness to heterogeneous fee sensitivity and cardinal miscalibration outweighs that cost. With bounded project values, abundance can turn an equal-load fee into an access screen, while the quota preserves within-author curation.
Comments6 pages
