发表机构
Bilkent University（比尔肯特大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
研究对立偏好发送者竞争下的及时说服博弈，发现竞争可使接收者效用严格提升，并刻画了纯策略均衡及预算阈值。
AI 中文摘要
状态更新使接收者能够跟踪一个变化的过程，但控制更新发送时机的发送者可以在不虚报的情况下操纵接收者的估计。我们研究了两个偏好对立的此类发送者之间的竞争，他们使用状态相关的泊松速率在各自预算下报告一个二元连续时间马尔可夫链。接收者仅当零阶保持估计器能产生至少与基于先验的默认估计相同的长期加权正确估计效用时，才采用该估计器。我们将该交互建模为Stackelberg博弈，其中受默认估计青睐的发送者先行动，对立发送者随后行动，接收者最后选择其估计器。我们以闭式形式刻画了纯策略均衡。当跟随者能在领导者沉默时获得正效用时，领导者有限的状态-0报告仅释放了跟随者部分预算用于状态-1报告，因此每个最优领导者策略要么是沉默，要么是全额预算的状态-0报告，具体取决于明确的预算阈值。具有相同总预算的单一发送者使接收者停留在其默认效用，而全额预算干预结果使接收者的参与约束松弛并严格提高其效用。在干预阈值处，沉默和全额预算干预产生相同的发送者收益但不同的接收者效用。数值结果说明了这些机制，并将均衡性能与接收者最优报告基准进行了比较。
英文摘要
Status updates let a receiver track a changing process, but a sender that controls when they are sent can steer the receiver's estimate without misreporting. We study competition between two such senders with opposing preferences, who report on a binary continuous-time Markov chain using state-dependent Poisson rates under individual budgets. The receiver follows the reports through a zero-order-hold estimator only if this yields at least the long-run weighted correct-estimation utility of a prior-based default estimate. We model the interaction as a Stackelberg game in which the sender favored by this default leads, the opposing sender follows, and the receiver then selects its estimator. We characterize the pure-strategy equilibria in closed form. When the follower can obtain positive utility against a silent leader, limited state-$0$ reporting by the leader merely frees part of the follower's budget for state-$1$ reports, so every optimal leader policy is either silence or full-budget state-$0$ reporting, depending on explicit budget thresholds. A single sender with the same total budget leaves the receiver at its default utility, whereas the full-budget intervention outcome makes the receiver's participation constraint slack and strictly improves its utility. At the intervention threshold, silence and full-budget intervention yield identical sender payoffs but different receiver utilities. Numerical results illustrate these regimes and compare equilibrium performance with a receiver-optimal reporting benchmark.
