发表机构
University of Georgia（佐治亚大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本研究揭示Matter智能家居标准在物理访问下存在凭证提取与设备冒充漏洞，可致持续监控，并验证了攻击的可行性，提出四项缓解策略。
AI 中文摘要
Matter旨在通过一个开放、互操作且安全的标准来统一智能家居生态系统，依赖密码机制实现设备认证和数据保密。然而，其开放性也将协议细节、凭证结构和实现特征暴露给对手。我们表明，拥有临时物理访问权限的攻击者可以利用设计和实现缺陷来提取凭证并冒充设备和控制器。这些复制品无缝集成到网络中，使攻击者即使在离开后也能进行持续监控和控制。值得注意的是，该攻击与供应商无关，且无需针对特定设备的逆向工程，只要设备未进行物理安全防护即可实施。我们通过在包含商业设备和开发板的模拟智能家居上进行概念验证，验证了其实用性。我们的发现揭示了Matter中先前被低估的攻击面，特别是在物理访问场景下，并提出了四项针对性的缓解策略。
英文摘要
Matter aims to unify smart home ecosystems through an open, interoperable, and secure standard, relying on cryptographic mechanisms for device authentication and data confidentiality. However, its openness also exposes protocol details, credential structures, and implementation characteristics to adversaries. We show that an attacker with temporary physical access can exploit design and implementation flaws to extract credentials and impersonate devices and controllers. These replicas integrate seamlessly into the fabric, enabling persistent surveillance and control even after the attacker departs. Notably, the attack is vendor-agnostic and requires no device-specific reverse engineering, as long as the device is not physically secured. We validate its practicality through a proof-of-concept on a simulated smart home with both commercial devices and development boards. Our findings uncover previously underestimated attack surfaces in Matter, particularly under physical access scenarios, and motivate four targeted mitigation strategies.
Comments14 pages, 5 figures
