MEM作为循环加工理论的延伸：迈向意识的动机性解释
MEM as an Extension of Recurrent Processing Theory: Toward a Motivational Account of Consciousness
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中文总结 AI 辅助
本文论证MEM模型作为循环加工理论的具身化和动机性延伸，强调次级知觉在现象意识中的作用，并提出其数学模型，但核心主张仍需因果验证。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
Victor Lamme的循环加工理论（RPT）提出，前馈扫描（FFS）可以在无意识状态下提取和分类视觉特征，而意识视觉则通过跨表征层次的循环加工和反馈交互产生。由Wiesław L. Galus和Janusz A. Starzyk提出的动机性情感心智（MEM）模型保留了这一核心原则，但将其嵌入一个具身架构中，该架构整合了多层网络、半层级相似体（semblions）、感受器、效应器、稳态调节、情感评估和基于记忆的感觉重建。本文考察了RPT与MEM之间实质性但有限的关系。RPT解释了循环在知觉组织中的作用以及向意识视觉的转变，而MEM则处理循环加工的内容、其在感受器活动和身体状态中的基础、其与记忆和行动的交互，以及重建的感觉表征在现象经验中的可能作用。特别强调了次级知觉：通过自上而下的感觉和内脏感觉图谱重建，记忆、心理意象、梦境、幻觉、感受和观察到的场景由此获得经验形式。因此，MEM将现象性不仅与循环活动或可报告性联系起来，而且与模态特异性、基于感受器的感觉和身体内容的重建联系起来。本文还介绍了MEM的数学模型，形式化了再入式加工、表征竞争、稳态调节、情感、好奇心、程序性缺口和行动选择。我们得出结论，MEM可以被视为RPT的具身化和动机性延伸。然而，其独特的主张，特别是次级知觉对现象性的充分性以及所提出的相似体微观结构，仍然是需要因果检验的假设。
英文摘要
Victor Lamme's Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT) proposes that the feedforward sweep (FFS) can extract and categorize visual features unconsciously, while conscious vision emerges through recurrent processing and feedback interactions across representational levels. The Motivated Emotional Mind (MEM) model, developed by Wiesław L. Galus and Janusz A. Starzyk, retains this core principle but embeds it in an embodied architecture integrating multilayer networks, semi-hierarchical semblions, receptors, effectors, allostasis, emotional valuation, and memory-based sensory reconstruction. This article examines the substantive but limited relationship between RPT and MEM. While RPT explains the role of recurrence in perceptual organization and the transition to conscious vision, MEM addresses the content of recurrent processing, its grounding in receptor activity and bodily states, its interaction with memory and action, and the possible role of reconstructed sensory representations in phenomenal experience. Particular emphasis is placed on secondary perception: the top-down reconstruction of sensory and interoceptive maps through which memories, mental imagery, dreams, hallucinations, feelings, and observed scenarios acquire experiential form. MEM thus associates phenomenality not merely with recurrent activity or reportability, but with the reconstruction of modality-specific, receptor-grounded sensory and bodily content. The article also presents the mathematical model of MEM, formalizing re-entrant processing, representational competition, allostasis, affect, curiosity, procedural gaps, and action selection. We conclude that MEM can be viewed as an embodied and motivational extension of RPT. However, its distinctive claims, particularly the sufficiency of secondary perception for phenomenality and the proposed microstructure of semblions, remain hypotheses requiring causal testing.
