通过干预实现增长：2010年以来匈牙利建筑业的政府需求与优先分配
Growth by Intervention: State Demand and Preferential Allocation in the Hungarian Construction Sector since 2010
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中文总结 AI 辅助
本文以匈牙利建筑业为案例，分析政府需求刺激与政治关联企业优先分配如何共同推动粗放型增长，但未带来效率提升。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
本文以匈牙利建筑业2010年后的扩张为案例，研究单一市场中大规模政府干预的影响。政治经济学框架将这种干预概念化为两种相互强化的政策——扩张性需求（公共采购和住房补贴）和向政治关联企业的优先分配——在供给无弹性的条件下，通过两种机制运作：市场层面的补贴资本化和企业层面的租金提取。本文采用结构化描述性案例研究设计，利用匈牙利中央统计局和欧盟统计局宏观经济统计数据、匈牙利最大企业的企业层面数据（CrefoPort）、政策文件以及区域比较，评估了从该框架推导出的四个命题。证据支持全部四个命题：实际建筑产出增速快于除罗马尼亚外的所有区域同行；建筑生产价格持续超过GDP平减指数；领先企业的所有权转向政治关联的国内所有者，其盈利能力急剧上升而出口仍微不足道；每小时劳动生产力到2024年大致回到2000年的水平；关联企业占据了行业利润中不断增长的份额，因为补贴的价值部分被其引发的价格上涨所侵蚀。竞争性解释无法共同解释这一格局。研究结果表明，需求刺激与偏袒相结合，产生了无效率提升的粗放型增长。
英文摘要
This paper examines the post-2010 expansion of the Hungarian construction sector as a case study of large-scale government intervention in a single market. A political economy framework conceptualises the intervention as two mutually reinforcing policies - expansionary demand (public procurement and housing subsidies) and preferential allocation towards politically connected firms - operating under inelastic supply through two mechanisms: market-level subsidy capitalisation and firm-level rent extraction. Using a structured descriptive case study design, the paper draws on Hungarian Central Statistical Office and Eurostat macroeconomic statistics, firm-level data on Hungary's largest companies (CrefoPort), policy documents, and a regional comparison to assess four propositions derived from the framework. The evidence supports all four: real construction output grew faster than in any regional peer except Romania; construction producer prices persistently outpaced the GDP deflator; ownership of the leading firms shifted towards politically connected domestic owners, whose profitability rose sharply while their exports remained negligible; labour productivity per hour worked returned by 2024 to roughly its 2000 level; and connected firms captured a rising share of sector profits, as the subsidies' value was partly eroded by the price increases they induced. Competing explanations do not jointly account for this configuration. The findings illustrate how combined demand stimulus and favouritism produce extensive growth without efficiency gains.
