发表机构
Academia Sinica; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)（中央研究院; 伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校; 产业技术综合研究所）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
我们提出统一框架，实现多种密码原语的恒定速率认证删除，无需额外假设，并支持公开可验证性。
AI 中文摘要
我们提出了一个统一框架，用于升级一大类密码原语以支持恒定速率的认证删除。先前的构造要求每个可认证删除明文的加密比特需要线性数量的量子比特。相比之下，我们在普通模型中获得了首个实现认证删除同时保持永恒安全性的恒定速率构造。我们的方法适用于基于BB84风格编码的广泛“全或无”类型原语，包括承诺方案、公钥加密、属性基加密和全同态加密。在这一类之外，我们还为基于子空间陪集态构建的原语获得了恒定速率认证删除，例如盲委托、安全软件租赁、功能加密、差异输入iO和CCA-PKE。重要的是，我们的框架不引入超出底层认证删除原语所需的任何额外假设。最后，在SIS困难性假设下，我们证明了可以将公开可验证性纳入基于BB84和陪集的认证删除中。结合我们的恒定速率构造，这产生了具有恒定速率的公开可验证认证删除方案。
英文摘要
We present a unified framework for upgrading a broad class of cryptographic primitives to support constant-rate certified deletion. Previous constructions require a linear number of qubits per encrypted bit of certified-deletable plaintext. In contrast, we obtain the first constant-rate constructions in the plain model that achieve certified deletion while preserving everlasting security. Our approach applies to a wide range of "all-or-nothing"-type primitives based on BB84-style encodings, including commitment schemes, public-key encryption, attribute-based encryption, and fully homomorphic encryption. Beyond this class, we also obtain constant-rate certified deletion for primitives built from subspace coset states, such as blind delegation, secure software leasing, functional encryption, and differing-inputs iO, and CCA-PKE. Importantly, our framework does not introduce any additional assumptions beyond those required by the underlying certified deletion primitives. Finally, under the hardness of SIS, we show that public verifiability can be incorporated into BB84- and coset-based certified deletion. In combination with our constant-rate constructions, this yields publicly verifiable certified deletion schemes with constant rate.
