发表机构
Tokyo Metropolitan University（东京都立大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文提出无需Cesaro平均极限假设即可解释无贴现重复博弈中零行列式策略的性能，获得比先前更强的结果。
AI 中文摘要
零行列式（ZD）策略是重复博弈中的一类策略，能够单方面控制收益。已有研究表明，多种ZD策略能促进社会困境博弈中的合作。普遍认为，ZD策略的性能表现为“单方面强制收益之间的线性关系”。然而，为了解释无贴现重复博弈中ZD策略的性质，先前的研究假设行动组合概率分布的Cesaro平均极限存在。在此，我们无需该假设即可解释ZD策略的性能，这导致比先前结果更强的结论。
英文摘要
Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies are a class of strategies in repeated games, which unilaterally control payoffs. It has been shown that several ZD strategies promote cooperation in social dilemma games. It has been widely believed that the performance of ZD strategies is expressed as ``unilaterally enforce linear relations between payoffs''. However, in order to interpret properties of ZD strategies in repeated games without discounting, previous studies assumed that the limit of the Cesaro average of the probability distribution of the action profile exists. Here, we explain the performance of ZD strategies without this assumption, which leads to a stronger result than previous ones.
Comments4 pages, 1 figure
